1. PREFACE
James
D. Mooney, engineer and corporate executive, was born in Cleveland, Ohio on 18
February, 1884. In 1908, he received a B.S. from Case School of Applied
Sciences in Mining and Metallurgy, leaving soon after graduation for gold
mining expeditions in Mexico and California. Between 1910 and 1917, he worked
successively at Westinghouse, B. F. Goodrich and Hyatt Roller Bearing Company
during which time he became increasingly involved in corporate management. In
1917, although somewhat over age, he enlisted and served as a captain in France
with the 309th Ammunition Regiment, 159th Field Artillery. He was honourably
discharged in the spring of 1919. At the close of the war, Mooney was named
President and General Manager of the Remy Electric Company, by then a
subsidiary of General Motors Corporation. In 1919, he was appointed an
Assistant Vice-President of General Motors Corporation, possibly at the same
time as President and G.M. of Remy Electric Company, and thus precessed one
step behind Alfred P. Sloan.
James D. Mooney had worked as
Sales Manager of the Hyatt Roller Bearing Company, and then Sales Manager of
the Remy Electric Company, from 1915 to 1917, until he volunteered for war
service. He returned, from war service in the autumn of 1919, and went back to
Remy. Mooney stated in October 1935 that he had travelled
through England with his Regiment in 1917, on his way to France, and then again
on return in the Autumn of 1919.[1]
It seems that
G.M. had previously considered acquiring Morris Motors Limited previously and
it is suggested that because of the interest in Morris, Mooney must have been
well aware of the agreement that William Morris later had with Budd about the
technology for all-steel bodies, which would then migrate to all-steel
chassis-less construction.
From 1920 to 1921 Mooney was
appointed President of Remy Electric Company in Andersen, Indiana, by Alfred P.
Sloan, Jr., and was thus responsible ultimately for the British
Remy operation. On 1 January 1922 Mooney
took over as General Manager of the General Motors Export Company with
business in more than one hundred countries.
He was appointed Vice-President and General Manager of the General Motors
Export Company on 1 January 1922 in succession to Peter Steenstrupp, the
Export Company having combined in 1918 with General Motors (Europe) Limited in
London, as it was then called: the next year it changed its name to General
Motors Limited. When J. Amory Haskell resigned on 15 November 1922 as President of
the Export Company, Mooney replaced him as President of the Export Company
instead.[2]
A.L. Haskell then took over from November 1922 to June 1925 as Vice-President
and General Manager in succession to Mooney. A few days after Mooney was
appointed President of the Export Company, he was further honoured at a special
meeting of the Board of Directors of General Motors Corporation by his election
to Vice-President of G.M.C. and a member of the board, which he was to maintain
until 1941. His new appointment gave him general charge of all G.M.’s overseas
activities. Haskell resigned as Vice-president and general manager of the
Export company 15 June 1925, and was replaced in turn by L.M. Rumely, former
Regional Director for Australia: Rumely sailed for Sydney on 22 April 1923, and
subsequently appointed “in the field”, Vice-president of the Export Company and
Regional Director for Australia. Mooney states in his memoirs that when he
first contemplated sales to Australia in 1922, he had to look up the country in
the atlas!
Mooney
stated in the autumn of 1936 that he had visited the Morris Motors Limited
factory in 1922, in Cowley, and had been asked by William Morris what he
thought of the operation. Morris Motors were at the time assembling the Cowley
Touring car, importing Timken axles and U.S.-built Continental engines. Some
chassis parts were made on the premises, but otherwise the wooden frame was
made on the premises and bought-in parts were added in what we would call now a
“screwdriver operation”. Mooney was
impressed with the great volume of business with a very low investment, and the
fact that there were only standard tools around. Morris laughed and replied “
But you would be surprised to know how much money I am making”! Mooney
commented to the industrial heads that he congratulated on their performance
over the previous 18 years, and had remarkable progress, and wished them all
the best for the future. Part of this improvement he put down to “an
enlightened government”.[3]
In the Spring and Summer of 1924, General Motors of
Canada Limited exhibited at the 1924 British Empire Exhibition at Wembley Park,
which saw the opening of Wembley Stadium. H.M. King George V officially opened
the British Empire Exhibition on 23 April 1924, and attending his father was
H.R.H. The Prince of Wales. James D. Mooney stated that he gave a speech from
the same platform as the Prince. The idea was to promote and display industrial
and social exhibits of the Empire, including Canada. The Canadian pavilion was
massive, and was one of the most, if not the most, well-visited of the various
pavilions housed in the 219 acre site. General Motors of Canada Ltd. occupied
3/5ths of the space in the Canadian car section. He also stated that Prime
Minister Stanley Baldwin[4]
as well as Minister of Transport, Leslie Hore-Belisha were well known to him[5].
Given that Mooney was appointed a Director of General Motors Limited on July 5th
1924, presumably he was resident in the U.K. from April to July, and attended a
meeting of the Board of General Motors Limited on the day that he was appointed
a Director.
Mooney headed a committee formed to acquire Austins.
Mooney was consistently a Director of General Motors Limited until 1941 that is
both companies, and therefore the longest-serving Director pre-1945. He was
also a member of the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders and evidently a
regular visitor to the U.K. Sloan reports in his book[6]
that the suggestion of acquiring Austin Motor Car Company Limited was first
mooted in 1924, presumably after the acquisition of Morris Motors Limited had
fallen through after, no doubt, constant negotiations. Mooney commissioned a
survey on the British motor industry and the domestic market in 1924. The
report pointed out that the tax on engine size [the “Horsepower Tax”] plus
fees, insurance and garage charges placed the Chevrolet Superior at $112
disadvantage with an Austin.[7]
In the spring of 1925, Mooney travelled to the U.K. to inspect Austins’ plant
and then in July 1925 was appointed to head a committee including John J.
Raskob and A.H. Swayne, to make a formal visit. In then meantime, the Hendon
Plant of General Motors Limited was allegedly turned over to assembly of
Chevrolets with locally produced commercial vehicle bodies in order to keep the
plant busy.[8]
In August, the committee unanimously recommended the purchase of Austins for
the sum of £1,333,000, which the G.M. Board agreed to, though Sloan quotes
$2,575,291 “as a kind of experiment in overseas manufacturing”, i.e. for a
company producing 1,500 “class cars” per year. Alfred P. Sloan then publicly
announced on September 1st [New York
Times] that the Austin company had agreed to the take-over subject to
shareholder approval, etc. Sloan again confirmed the financial arrangements in
the New York Times 5 September 1924, but three directors of
Austins disagreed with their colleagues, and on 11 September, G.M. withdrew its
offer. This approach to take over Austin was seized upon by the British Press,
as well as the American, and as Mooney later stated in 1936, he was cast as an
American “Romeo”, with the “lover” being Herbert Austin.[9]
In The Motor 27 October 1925 there
was an article “THE BRITISH MOTOR INDUSTRY FOR THE BRITISH NATION”, for
instance.
On
21 October 1925, according to Arthur Pound[10],
there was a proposal to acquire Vauxhall Motors Limited instead, which was
completed 24 November 1925, probably through Morgan Grenfell, G.M.’s Merchant
Bankers, who had dealt with the Austin proposals. G.M. then acquired the
majority of the share capital in Vauxhalls for £510,000. However, we now know
that although Sloan made the official announcements, it was in fact James D.
Mooney at the “sharp end”. Mooney lived in a house, which was presumably
rented, about 20 miles north of London, until at least December 1925. When the
news was revealed there was a huge outcry: Maurice Platt in his autobiography
states that Vauxhall Motors had:
“hundreds of letters from readers, deploring
the sale of on eof the pioneering British motor companies to the Americans, in
which a recurrent theme was the change in character of the car which was
certain to ensue under the new management. One result of this was that the
General Motors connection was never mentioned in Vauxhall’s advertising or
“sales promotion” for many years thereafter”.
However,
Ford was not affected by these sentiments![11]
In fact there is no evidence that there was any reference to General Motors in
Vauxhall advertising pre-war!
Mooney made a speech in late November of 1925 to
fellow Americans in London just as the negotiations for acquiring Vauxhall
Motors Limited were coming to the fore, and a few days before the acquisition
was completed: in fact it was a justification for purchasing Vauxhalls. His
speech ambles on, what the most relevant points which he proposed, and which
were of relevance 10 years later were:
Labour: “our British workmen are always willing and have always been
willing to do a good day’s work for a fair day’s pay”.
Economic background:
a) The
raw materials were always available, and the industrial and production
facilities that had to provide the general background for producing cars in
quantities existed readily and within a comparatively limited area.
b) The
mental approach to manufacturing a high-grade complex product like a motor car
was readily available, with a complete industrial tradition and background
including elements of personnel, management, engineering, mechanical
craftsmanship, which supported a broad manufacturing programme.
c) The
U.K. was faced with the economic necessity of capitalising to better advantage
manufacturing high-grade, complex, fine quality products. Motor car assembly
fitted into this requirement as one of the U.K.’s economic necessities.
The rising costs of raw materials which
were endangering competitiveness in world markets could be remedied by
increasing the amount of labour on the products that were exported, so that
less items shipped in a raw or semi-finished state, and an increase in
manufactured goods, i.e. by increasing the degree of fabrication of U.K. manufactures
for export would be considerably advantageous.
General
Motors found that the U.K. had the general elements that provided a sound basis
for investment in the motor industry, with high character values, the amount
and character of labour needed, the fundamental production facilities, and an
expanding market. The U.K. provided the entire background that was needed to
support the manufacture of motor cars that could compete on the world’s
markets.
Mooney
stated that as an American, speaking to Americans, that [G.M.] would develop
more cordial relations between Americans and the British Empire. They did not
intend to play the role of “hands across the seas”, as this was in the sage
hands of [politicians] on both sides of the Atlantic. Mooney said that he had
been living in a village 20 miles or so north of London for some time, which
seems to have had a profound effect on him, by contact with the local
Vicar. This had resulted, according to
the clergyman, “a more brotherly union among the English speaking peoples of
the World”.[12]
In 1926, General Motors Corporation tried to acquire
Morris Motors Limited for $11 million, but were rejected, and then entered into
an auction with William Morris and Herbert Austin for the bankrupt Wolseley
company: Morris won that battle.
2.
OPEL JOINS THE EMPIRE
Automotive Industries 30 March 1929 announced that General Motors had
purchased Opel. It was stated that on 20 March 1928, James D. Mooney, President
of the G.M. Export Company, speaking before the Export Managers’ Club of New
York referred in his speech to that of “the building of an industrial and
commercial empire”. The next year, G.M. Corporation acquired all of the shares
in Vauxhall Motors Limited that it did not already own, and that year, 1928,
Delco-Remy & Hyatt Limited came under total G.M. ownership. However,
alongside this was an announcement made on 18 March 1929 by Alfred P. Sloan
Jnr., President of G.M. Corporation, at Wiesbaden, Germany, that General Motors
Corporation had formed an association with Adam Opel Company in Rüsselsheim,
Germany, a substantial interest in that company being taken at a cost of
approximately US$30 million. The financial world had already guessed that
something was afoot by October 1928, and finally when Messrs. Sloan and Mooney
left for Germany by ship and the rumours seemed to have been confirmed. In
fact, and General Motors World confirms[13],
that the Adam Opel was experiencing a decline in its domestic market as it
lacked funds for modern machinery and equipment, and had no adequate export
facilities either. G.M. were apparently to be wishing to expand into those
export markets where German-made cars sold, just as the decision was made to
increase exports of Vauxhalls from 1930 to the British Empire markets, though
southern Africa was one Empire area that Opel met success in and yet Vauxhalls
did not. G.M. had realised that so far as exports were concerned, the larger
North American car was losing out to smaller, cheaper, more economical cars
favoured by the European manufacturers. G.M. therefore needed a Continental
base for its North American and British products, and of course G.M. had
assembly plants all over Europe as well as subsidiary sales companies. Thus,
during the latter part of 1928, Geheimrat
Wilhelm von Opel met and talked to G.M. executives and the many advantages of
taking over an existing factory persuaded G.M. to buy-out Opel on a majority
basis.
The exact price was put at $28
million. On the 24 January 1929, the Opel family holdings were placed into a
limited liability company. Shares were issued totalling 60,000 with a par value
of 1000 marks each, capitalising the company at over $12 million. This was a
holding company for the Opel works, and public offering of stock was made, but
the Opel family retained control. It was then surmised that G.M. paid $28
million for 76% of the stock which represented the Opel family holdings, or
more than twice the par value of the company! 18 March it was stated that the
new board of directors would consist of five Americans and three Germans and
that an American would displace the then head of the firm, Fritz Opel. However,
Sloan went on to say that Opels would be run as an independent organisation by
the then present management committee, with G.M. engineering, manufacturing,
financing and managerial co-operation. However, this time G.M. had acquired a
majority stake in a company five times that of Vauxhall Motors Limited!
Mooney, Edward C. Riley and Alfred Swayne, formerly
of G.M. Export Company New York, were appointed directors of Vauxhall Motors
Limited in 1925, though Riley resigned in August 1926 to become Managing
Director of G.M. Continental until July 1930. Mooney remained a director of
Vauxhalls until 1940 though. Ronald K. Evans the Regional Director for Europe,
was appointed as Managing Director of Vauxhall Motors to replace Leslie Walton
who was promoted Chairman. In 1930, Mooney was asked by Sloan to pick an
Englishman to run Vauxhall, whose sales programmes had been subordinated to
G.M. Limited in 1928. In addition, post-Wall Street Crash, the anti-American
sentiments concerning Chevrolet cars and trucks assembled in Luton required
measures to emphasise their “Britishness”. The 40-year old Charles John
Bartlett was appointed Managing Director of Vauxhall Motors Limited in
succession to Evans, because allegedly his capabilities had been noted during
the investigations and financial planning that preceded the purchase of
Vauxhalls in 1925. However, a story at the time was that Sloan asked Mooney to
pick an Englishman to run Vauxhall, and Mooney suggested that they pick
Bartlett, as “he’s about as English as they come”. Bartlett
was born in 1889 to a modest family from Bibury, Gloucestershire. He received
training in business methods from Bath Technical College specialising in
accounting. During the First World War he gained the rank of sergeant having
joined the Devonshire regiment. He was injured in Loos and later served in the
Middle East and then joined G.M. Limited in
1919 as a clerk at £3 per week. In 1921 he joined General Motors Limited
at Hendon as an accounting clerk. In August 1926, Bartlett was appointed
Managing Director of Limited in succession to Riley, only to move across to
Vauxhall in the same year. From September 1930 he would assume the same role at
Vauxhall. Bartlett remained as Managing Director of G.M. Limited until the
company was dissolved in 1934. However, Bartlett was also appointed a director
of the British G.M. subsidiaries, Delco-Remy & Hyatt Limited in 1930 and
then AC-Sphinx Sparking Plug Company Limited in 1931.
As
part of his responsibilities in managing overseas production, Mooney travelled
extensively throughout the world, visiting G.M.C.'s numerous manufacturing and
assembly plants. In this capacity, he was afforded the opportunity of meeting
with "top-flight government officials and others in positions of power and
influence, and with them discussed not only their own economic problems but
also the impact of the international situation on their own countries and on
economic affairs." Mooney became a pioneer in the development of
management thought and the nature of organisation. Many of his theories and
practical experiences were widely read and studied in Onward Industry (1931), later re-worked and re-titled The Principles of Organisation. The
success of G.M.C. Overseas was due in large part to Mooney's ability to adapt
American methods and technology to existing conditions of amazingly diverse
natures.
Mooney’s
various trips to Europe convinced him that the Treaty of Versailles was responsible
for many of Europe’s post-war ills. In 1930, he delivered a speech calling
attention to the follies of the Treaty. “Not very long after the great nations
laid down their arms an economic warfare began that has increased in momentum
and intensity until we find ourselves today, twelve years after the armistice,
beginning more or less seriously to discuss war again”.[14]
Mooney states in his unpublished autobiography that
in the lifetime of the Weimar Republic, he met various leaders from time to time
including Chancellor Heinrich Bruening, Hjalmar Schacht and others. Then, with
the “start of Hitlerism”, he came to Nazi leaders especially well because the
government began moving in more prominently on industry, which required
frequent meetings with various members of the regime.[15]
General
Motors World, June 1934 referred to James D. Mooney’s
discussions with Hitler on 1 May 1934. Mooney was in Berlin at the time on a
European trip, and apart from visiting Berlin, he also visited London. The 1 May was celebrated as the first
anniversary of the German “New Deal” under Hitler’s guidance [not to be
confused with Schacht’s New Plan of September 1934]. Mooney was invited to see
Hitler’s landing at Tempelhof airfield, and the triumphal motorcade to the Chancellery.
The next day, Mooney was invited to meet the Chancellor and was accompanied by
Ronald K. Evans and R.A. Fleischer of Opel. They discussed the automotive
industry in Germany, and Opel’s important place in it as the leading
manufacturer of cars. Hitler characterised the 1.2 litre Opel [the Model P-4]
as his conception of the true Volkswagen,
the car for the German masses. The G.M. men apparently thought that this was
welcome news as many interpretations of what Hitler would consider a Volkswagen had leaned towards a baby or
cyclecar class vehicle, as per Porsche’s first attempt through NSU. Hitler
definitely stated that any car giving less package size and less performance
than the 1.2 litre Opel "would be an imposition upon the German people”. Hitler
estimated that using the U.S. as a standard, Germany should have 12 million
cars, but realised that the difference in conditions would make 3 million more
logical.
In a discussion on how to
benefit more German families to enjoy the benefits of car ownership, Dr.
Fleischer demonstrated to Hitler that whilst the buyer paid only RM1,880 for
the 1.2 litre Opel saloon, he had to spend an additional RM7,700 in operating
costs during the expected seven years of use. Simply reducing the acquisition
cost would not make much wider use of cars that Hitler was calling for. The
Chancellor then admitted that this was valid, and said that he would definitely
see to it that operating costs were reduced. There was no logic in a small and
dark garage costing RM30-40 per month when comfortable furnished rooms were
available at RM25. To bring down garaging costs, he promised to rescind the
rigid building regulation regulations relating to garages, as well as making
street parking legal. Hitler also asked that Opel’s experience with car
insurance be placed at his disposal as he thought insurance costs could also
safely be cut. He also mentioned the possibility of reducing gasoline taxes and
prices to accelerate Germany’s motorization.[16]
Anita Kugler comments
that the Reich foreign ministry notes state that Mooney was supposed to receive
assurances that the Führer would
“allow no discrimination against foreign capital invested in legitimate
business pursuits in Germany. That also applies, despite the special German
interest in advancing the German motor vehicle industry, to the capital of
General Motors and similar companies. He naturally expects that German capital
abroad is just as secure”. Hitler’s promise was not broken, she says, and Opel
had been treated as though it was a German company.[17]
Wilhelm von Opel has been
regarded dimly in histories of the Volkswagen car because he tended to be
critical of the Porsche project. However, Ferdinand Porsche had been engaged
since 1934 to develop designs for the Volkswagen,
though the contract originated not with the Reich
government, but with the Society of German Automobile Manufacturers of which
von Opel was a life member. Neither he nor Mooney, as private industrialists
can have been expected to be opposed to the Kraft
durch Freude car and all the restraints on industry of the time.
In 1935 Mooney was
appointed a member of the General Motors Corporation’s Executive Committee,
though it is not known yet whether he was appointed to the board as well.
There were also speeches in 1935 and 1936 to the
British motor industry in London that were in fact of no great consequence,
though this proves that he visited General Motors Limited on several occasions
in those years. Mooney made a
speech at the Car Distributors Section, Motor Traders Association, on 22
October 1935. Then, about a year later, at the Banquet of the Society of Motor
Manufacturers and Traders in London on 14 October 1936, Mooney commented to the
industrial heads he congratulated on their performance over the previous 18 years,
and had remarkable progress, and wished them all the best for the future. Part
of this improvement he put down to “an enlightened government”.
Guy Nicholas Vansittart was appointed Regional
Director for the European Region in March 1937, and then on 1 January 1938 the
European Region was split into the North European region under David F. “Dave”
Ladin [based in Copenhagen]; Mediterranean Region under G.D. Riedel bases in
Alexandria, Egypt], and Central European Region under Vansittart [based in
Antwerp]. On 30 September 1938, with the formation of General Motors Operations
Division by the merger of the Export Division with the German and Vauxhall
operations, Vansittart was appointed Regional Director for the British Isles
based in London, and Arthur J. Wieland Regional Director for Western Europe,
based in Antwerp.
In view of the information
below, it is queried as to when Vansittart and Mooney first came into contact
with each other. Mooney brought a number of young men into the Export Company
from 1923 onwards, and this included Edward C. Riley, on 1 January 1923, and
probably arranged for him to be appointed Managing Director of General Motors
Continental, Antwerp, in 1926. Vansittart joined the Sales Department of
Continental in April 1925, but left and rejoined as Sales Manager in May 1927,
being promoted Assistant Managing Director under Riley until the latter was
promoted again in July 1930 to Regional Director for Europe based in Antwerp,
and Vansittart succeeded Riley as Managing Director of G.M. Continental. Riley
and Vansittart had worked together from at least 1927 therefore, and it can
only be suggested that Mooney had known Vansittart from then as well. R.W.
Seeley, a future General Motors Limited director, was appointed Mooney’s
Assistant in August 1936, until he was appointed 1 April 1937 as Managing
Director of General Motors Nørdiska, Stockholm.
3. MORE THAN AN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESSMAN AND
ECONOMIST
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Mooney made the following
speeches that were of relevance to the American-German relations[18]:
18
January 1934 “International Trade”
23
January 1934 “Paper Money and Gold Prices in International Trade”
23
June 1934 “America’s Stake in International Trade”
10
August 1934 “Paper Money and Gold in International Trade”
9
October 1934 “Fallacies and Realities in International Trade”
20
December 1934 “International Economic Relations”
1934
“Developing Foreign Trade”
10
June 1935 “Economic Values of International Trade”
18
July 1935 “The International Money Situation”
17
September 1935 “The American Foreign Trade Situation”
1935
“Foreign Trade and Domestic Markets”
24
January 1936 “Remarks Before the Foreign Trade Council”
7
February 1936 “American Neutrality and Trade”
16
November 1936 “Stabilizing the Exchanges”
25
January 1935 “The Impending War in Europe-and a Gamble Toward Halting It”
17
April 1937 “American Economic Policies for the Impending World War”
1
May 1937 “What World War Will Mean for Us and What we Can Do About It”
18
May 1937 “Peace or War: A Trade Policy for America”
27
May 1937 “German-American Trade A Shadow of Its Former Self”
January
1938 Stabilizing The Exchanges”
14
January 1938 “Some Observations on Economics, Politics and Government”
27
January 1938 “European Observations”
25
May 1938 “Remarks at World Fair Dinner/Foreign Trade Week”
16
June 1938 “Gold, Paper Money and Commodity Prices”
19
January 1939 “Paper Money: A National and International Hazard”
4
February 1939 “Economic Policies for the Next World War”
Mooney travelled extensively,
throughout the world, and visited G.M.’s numerous manufacturing and assembly
Plants. In this capacity he was afforded the opportunity of meeting with
top-flight government officials and others in positions of power and influence,
and with them discussed their own economic problems but also the impact of the
international situation on their own countries and on economic affairs. He had
the ability to adapt U.S. methods and technology to existing conditions of
amazingly diverse natures.
Mooney expressed the
inadequacies of traditional diplomacy by arguing that diplomats were frequently
“willing to risk millions of lives rather than to try and see the other side
and to arrive at conclusions which involve some give-and-take on both sides,
but which are far, far, cheaper than the resort to war”. Hitler awarded the German Order of Merit of the Eagle in 1938 to
Mooney: the is was the highest award that could be given to a foreigner, and
the same decoration as awarded to Henry Ford in July 1938 by the German Consul
in the U.S.
“In
Germany, Dr. Schacht kept pointing out all the time, even after Hitler had
taken charge, that his country was headed for a bad end unless steps were taken
with the help and co-operation of other great powers to export manufactured
wares in exchange for food…”[19]
3.2
BUSINESS IN GERMANY
“With my far-flung international contacts as General Motors Overseas
executive, and on the basis of what I could observe directly in the course of
my travels, I could not but note that the world was, alas, once again headed
for war”.[22] Mooney
expressed this view in an address before the Economic Club of New York in 1937:
“There is a great war threatening in Europe. When this great war will come,
whether it will come at all, I do not even pretend to be able to say. But I do
know that the Germans will not starve. They will be on the march again before
they starve. America and her recent allies could make an intelligent gamble
toward halting this march and the war by putting up the food for Germany in
exchange for guarantees for peace”. He claims that he was then a “voice crying
in the wilderness”. Money pointed out that Europe was “getting itself tied up
in an economic knot particularly because of tariff barriers. In insisted that
hungry people will march across borders if you don’t break down the barriers to
the flow of trade”. [23]Mooney
made various speeches that year: 25 January 1935 “The Impending
War in Europe- and a Gamble Toward Halting It”; 17 April 1937 “American
Economic Policies for the Impending World War”; 1 May 1937 “What World War Will
Mean for Us and What we Can Do About It”; 18 May 1937 “Peace or War: A Trade
Policy for America” and finally 27 May 1937 “German-American Trade A Shadow of
Its Former Self”. [24]
It was probably the latter that his comments were made in because the other, [not “another”] speaker at the same
evening was Dr. Hjalmar Schacht himself, President of the Reichsbank and
Minister for Economics. He
was asked after his address numerous questions from the 1,500 or so members of
the audience: however three-quarters of the answers were simply references to
Mooney’s speech, stating that Mooney had already anticipated Schacht’s answer
by comments already made.
“In Germany, Dr. Schacht kept pointing out all the time, even after
Hitler had taken charge, that his country was headed for a bad end unless steps
were taken with the help and co-operation of other great powers to export
manufactured wares in exchange for food…”[25]
Mooney excuses his visits to Berlin as General Motors had a “great deal
at stake” in Adam Opel A.G., with a company of 26,000 German employees. It was
thus natural to see men like Schacht as American industrial managers went to
Washington. Mooney states that Schacht was always helpful and extremely eager
to assist the operations in Germany. Schacht apparently realised that “American
engineers were making a great contribution potentially to the industrial and
economic life of Germany, particularly in the field of standards of living,
because naturally the motor car is an important factor in connection with the
standard of living.” Schacht naturally wanted to encourage G.M. in every
possible way and to help the Corporation make the venture succeed”. This is
with respect sheer smokescreen on the part of Schacht: Mooney would not have
personally fallen for this line, although he had in fact made much the same
points to Hitler in 1934. Mooney was too astute to not realise that the German
government sought the benefits of foreign exchange in the first instance, and
the use of facilities for all-out industrial techno-war. For reasons of
diplomacy to satisfy certain quarters in both countries, including those who
had interests in American-German trade, this front had to be presented.
It is not yet known when Mooney first met President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt, but we do know that Mooney met “FDR” on 7 March 1935 at the White
House. This enabled Mooney to be able to approach the President much later on:
see below.[26]
Mooney states that he was called “up to” Berlin [which suggests that he
was in Rüsselsheim at the time] by German bureaucrats who were objecting to the
manner in which “we” [G.M. Overseas Operations Group] were pricing Opel cars
for export. The General Manager at the time was Ronald K. Evans, so this dates
it to prior to July 1936, when Evans left for the U.S. to become a Corporation
Vice-president and was replaced by E.R. Palmer, Assistant General Manager of
Adam Opel since March 1933.[27]
Because foreign exchange was a difficult problem, as Germany had no gold, the
bureaucrats were apparently sceptical about anyone who was seemingly exporting
capital out of the country. The bureaucrats challenged Opel’s costs as they
thought the costs and prices placed on cars for export were too low. This suggests
that this meeting was indeed around October 1935 as the Brandenburg truck Plant
had not officially opened until January 1936 and major exports had thus not
started. Mooney states that Dr. Schacht “did us the courtesy” of attending the
meeting, and defended G.M.’s cause, taking issue with his fellow bureaucrats.[28]
This is either a false or naive interpretation of events: there were several
Reich departments involved in export subsidies overseen by Schacht with overall
responsibility and interest in exports. A retrospective and non-jaundiced view
is that this was a clever and successful attempt by the Reich ministries and
the Reichsbank to have detailed assessments of costs, export potential,
foreign-currency potential, etc. in the manner of an internal revenue audit,
with Schacht then playing the trump card of appearing to be an amicus curiae or “best friend” to the
manufacturer once the audit had been completed to his satisfaction. Ever the
diplomat, Schacht obtained the required information sought and at the same time
enhanced the impression of the importance of Opel to the Reich economy.
Mooney states that two German representatives travelled to New York in
the autumn of 1936 to plead that G.M. put up $1,000,000 to finance Adam Opel’s
own rubber requirements in Germany as demanded by a newly-introduced government
ruling. Apparently Ford Werke also had a similar
requirement levied on them.[29]
G.M. put up the money, but only after receiving assurances that the
expenditure would be liquidated by means of barter transactions and exports of
Opel cars and trucks. It was further agreed that the German government would
assume the financing responsibility for crude rubber in about a year. G.M. did
not therefore put up dollars in cash, but compounded their difficulties in
extracting dividends out of Adam Opel by having to enter into barter and export
deals. One of the two representatives was an Adam Opel director from 1935, and
President of the company, Professor Dr. Karl Lüer, who was appointed Chairman
of the company in 1942. R.K. Evans was General Manager of Adam Opel at the
time.
In
the summer of 1938, Mooney, as a U.S. Naval reserve officer
[Lieutenant-Commander?] was serving on the U.S.S.
Enterprise, an aircraft carrier, with a Captain Wallace L. Lind.[30]He
did not otherwise mention his U.S.N.R. commission in any way in his memoirs
until 1940 when he took advantage of the Naval signals system for his messages
back to Washington. However, after Pearl Harbor, Mooney was taken on active
duty and his career is of considerable interest since it hints that he had been
involved in intelligence work of some sort in peacetime.
3.3 PRE-WAR VISITS TO ENGLAND AND GERMANY
“So far as England was concerned, I had not only lived there, but had
been responsible for investing millions of dollars of capital in a British
manufacturing venture. Moreover, I had many personal friends in England, who to
sure, knew that I was difficult at times, but who were also aware that I could
be trusted to keep my mouth shut and be on the level. My war record, moreover,
was an added guaranty that I would not sell the Allies down the river.”[31]
The
very respected military and automotive historian, Mr. Bart Vanderveen wrote in
the specialist but well-circulated military vehicle magazine Wheels & Tracks in 1984 that in the
summer of 1938 the War Office in London was approached by a “senior
representative of the General Motors Corporation”, who came to discuss possible
British requirements in the even of conflict. The W.O. showed a “certain amount
of interest”, which caused the representative to immediately contact all
G.M.O.O. plants and requested them if not instructed them to “freeze” all truck
output in order to give the British first option on purchasing trucks if
required. The W.O. then received the following day a written statement of the
quantities and locations of vehicles available. However, with the apparent
resolution of the crisis as a result of the Munich agreement, the Treasury felt
that they did not need to take up the offer. However, as a means of expressing
gratitude for the endeavours, the British W.O. awarded a contract for 500
Chevrolet trucks to be assembled in the General Motors Near East plant in the
Rue des Ptolomées, Alexandria, Egypt. This assembly plant was under the
Mediterranean Regional Director, G.D. Riedel from 1 January 1938, and the
Region also covered the Bombay, India, plant for instance. We know that
Contract V3352 was placed to supply 500 Chevrolet trucks from the Ministry of
Supply census records, which were all supposedly British military orders, and
Mr Vanderveen quotes 350 of these as being either cargo or water tanker trucks.[32]
They would all have been based on civilian style 1940 series WA trucks, and
indeed similar trucks were supplied to General Motors Limited in 1940 for the
civilian market, all built in June and July 1940, according to registration
evidence, and slightly larger trucks, series WB, were also sold in the U.K. as
civilian trucks which were built in December 1939.[33]There
is adequate proof that a large order was placed, and there is no evidence to
suggest that an approach was not in fact made in 1938. However, did Mooney make
the offer, or was it, say, Guy Nicholas “Nick” Vansittart, the Regional
Director for Central Europe, as he then was, as he was appointed Regional
Director for the British Isles in November 1938, after Munich [although the
events have no connection on the face of it? We know that Mooney was away at
sea in the summer of 1938, but was he in the U.K. in September, say? We can
place him in London at the beginning of November though, as mentioned below.
Would anyone else in G.M.O.O. have had the authority to obtain the information
on stocks held by G.M. in Egypt and India, and perhaps Belgium, presumably by
telegraphing the plants concerned? If it was not Mooney, then it was most
likely Nick Vansittart given his position and connections, and he acted with
Mooney’s authority. Having said that, if Mooney had made the offer, then he
would have been acting in tandem and with the assistance of Nick Vansittart.
The result was the same whomever was there in person!
On Friday 5 November 1938,
James D. Mooney went to see the Southern Railway Docks & Marine Manager,
R.P. Biddle. He apparently visited Southampton and saw the new Plant which was
now finished, and would have called in at the London H.Q.[34]
In addition, he went to see Charles Bartlett, the Chairman of Vauxhall Motors
Limited. Bartlett was apparently quite
off-handed towards Mooney: the latter had allowed him a considerable degree of
independence on the basis that British managers understood British workers
better. However, a few years later, after Mooney had resigned, Edward C. Riley
wrested back control over Vauxhall and the two apparently failed to see
eye-to-eye until Bartlett finally retired.[35]
A
relevant piece of information not revealed by Mooney in Lochner’s draft is
revealed by the file on James D. Mooney in the papers of Secretary of Commerce
in Washington, Harry Hopkins. The file contains a letter from Mooney to
Hopkins, dated 21 March 1939, submitting a twenty-seven page document on
Monetary Policy and a note from Henry Chalmers, Chief, Division of Foreign
Trade, Department of Commerce dated 26 May 1939, commenting on the report[36].
James D. Mooney sailed from New York on the SS Europa for one of his regular visits
to the European operations of General Motors on Tuesday night, 21 March 1939,
presumably after he had finished and despatched the letter to Hopkins.[37]
He landed in Southampton[38],
and was presumably as was usual, met on the dockside by G.M. Limited managers
who then showed him the new Plant under construction. We know Mooney was in
London on or about the 27th March, and he thus probably arrived on
the 26th or 27th. Mooney says that he met Guy Nicholas
“Nick” Vansittart, Regional Director for the British Isles, and Geheimrat Wilhelm von Opel, Chairman of
the Board of Adam Opel A.G. in London, though meeting at Southampton and then
taking the train or car to London is more logical. Vansittart and von Opel had
disturbing news about several engineering executives who had been taken into
German police custody on a charge of alleged activities inimical to Germany’s
national economy in general, and its automotive industry in particular. It was
agreed that Mooney would proceed to Berlin to investigate. As Mooney, Riley,
and Opel were all in London, 27 and 28 March it is suggested that they must
have visited the Southampton Plant together with Nick Vansittart.
Together with Edward C. Riley, then Assistant
General Manager of G.M. Overseas Operations [under Graeme K. Howard, the
General Manager, G.M.O.O., and Mooney as President], who was also travelling in
Europe, Mooney left for Berlin 29 March 1939 [with von Opel?] arriving morning
of 30 March. Mooney spent the following week strenuously trying to expedite the
official investigation of the charges against the engineers, which Mooney said
the company knew were unfounded. Two men proved very co-operative and helpful
in securing clearance for the men: Raymond H. Geist, American Chargé d’Affaires
in Berlin and Joachim “von” Ribbentrop, the Reich Foreign Minister. By 6 April,
the men were released with a “clean bill of health”.[39]
One of the men was executive engineer Karl Stief who was in fact a member of
the Committee of Management of Adam Opel A.G. from 1937 to 1940 at least. Stief
and the others whom had been arrested not by the Kriminalpolizei, or “Kripos”,
but by the Geheimstaatspolizei, the “Gestapo”. Mooney wrote to Geist who was
then Counsellor at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, on 11 July 1947 and stated
that he head heard two weeks previously from Stief, whom Geist had helped
Mooney get out of the clutches of the Gestapo.[40]
Soon after Mooney arrived in Berlin he advised Adam
Opel President, Dr. Karl Lüer of Mooney’s desire to have the rubber financing
procedure discontinued. Lüer arranged for a dinner to be given on 19 April in
the Berlin apartment maintained by Opels so that he could discuss the subject
with Dr. Emil Puhl, a director of the Reichsbank [and the Vice-president], and
Dr. Helmuth E.H. Wohlthat, departmental chief [Ministerialdirektor] on Generalfeldmarschall
Göering’s special staff for the functioning of the “Four-Year Plan”.[41]
Puhl, who introduced Wohlthat to Mooney, sat at Mooney’s left and right at
dinner, respectively, with various other German officials and Adam Opel
executives flanking them. Mooney reminded that the rubber plan was meant to
last for a year, and had in fact operated a year longer than agreed: it was
time for it to be terminated. Mooney said that the greatest contribution to the
German foreign exchange problem was made by the export of Opel products and not
by purchases incidental to the rubber plan [because G.M. had agreed to
discharge the $1 million rubber scheme by means of barter and Opel exports: the
barter arrangements must have required complex deals]. Mooney argued that the
disposition of any foreign exchange created was fundamentally the concern of
the German government authorities and that it was not desirable to have G.M.
working within a certain specialised and restricted area creating foreign
exchange earmarked for Opel’s specific rubber requirements. He also pointed out
the special difficulties created by the plan in New York where it drew
attention and emphasis greatly in excess of its true magnitude. The plan had
outlived its usefulness and should be gradually liquidated, with responsibility
for Opel’s internal domestic rubber requirements being taken over by the German
authorities. A unanimous agreement on the desirability of developing an alternate
plan for rubber financing was agreed. [42]
Mooney took the opportunity to present at the dinner
to deliver his own “blockbuster”: if the Germans could negotiate some form of
gold loan, would they be willing to stop their subsidised exports and special
exchange practices which were so annoying to foreign traders, particularly the
U.K. and the U.S. Whilst Mooney clearly
honestly believed that this might ensure peace, in truth the practices had had
a deleterious effect on General Motor’s extraction of profit out of Germany.
Wohlthat and Puhl reputedly readily agreed to this proposal if there was the
slightest possibility of negotiating a gold loan with which the Germans could
resume normal trading arrangements. The reason for the attraction of the gold
loan is twofold: firstly, the supply of foreign currency had sunken because of
preparations for the invasion of Czechoslovakia and replenishment was
considered necessary for increasing armaments, and secondly because Schacht’s
replacement as President of the Reichsbank, Walter Funk, who had served under
Göering in the Four Year Plan, was in the process of secretly transferring all
available funds of the Reichsbank abroad into gold. Mooney probably had no idea
that the prospect of a gold loan would have seemed extremely attractive to the
Reichsbank and Göering’s office. Mooney remained in Berlin the following day to
witness the celebrations and huge military parade to celebrate Hitler’s
birthday on 20 April, and then left for London that night[43].
Whilst Mooney was in Europe, Alfred P. Sloan, Jr.
chaired the General Motors Corporation General Meeting [“Stockholders’
Meeting]. Sloan is reputed to have said “we are too big to be affected by petty
international squabbles…the company’s operations in Germany are highly profitable
and the internal politics of Nazi Germany should not be considered the business
of the management of General Motors….”.[44]
and commented “We must conduct ourselves [in Germany] as a German organization.
We have no right to shut down the [Rüsselsheim] Plant”.[45]
However, there is no evidence as yet that this letter existed: it has been
oft-quoted and yet the original has not been found yet, casting doubt on
whether it was genuine.
After Mooney arrived in London, 21 April, 1939, he
paid a courtesy call on the U.S. Ambassador, Joseph Kennedy, whereupon he
acquainted him of the discussion with Wohlthat and Puhl. Kennedy suggested a
meeting with Puhl in Paris and asked Mooney to see if he could arrange such a
meeting. Mooney made an appointment with Francis Rodd, a partner in Morgan
Grenfell & Co. in the City, with whom Mooney was well acquainted, to be
appraised of the technicalities involved in a gold loan. Mooney asked Rodd on
the various steps necessary to provide an Anglo-American gold loan to Germany.
Rodd replied that there had been a great deal of discussion on that subject
from time to time in the City by people who believed a move of that sort should
be made, and he happened to be one of them. Rodd thought that an Anglo-German
loan might be made through the Bank for International Settlements in Basle,
Switzerland. Germany had been a party to the B.I.S., and the U.K. and the U.S.
could deposit gold in the B.I.S. accordingly. Rodd pointed out that the B.I.S.
provided a flexible medium for avoiding conflict with some of the internal
legal limitations on international loans.[46] Mr. Montagu Norman, Governor of the Bank of England,
was presumably associated with the International Bank, as he can be placed in
Basel where he had seen Dr. Schacht. This must have been before the end of
January 1939 as Schacht resigned/was dismissed on 20 January as President of
the Reichsbank
Mooney returned to Berlin 29 April, stopping at
Antwerp en route, probably meeting Nick Vansittart again. On 2 May, Mooney wrote from his Berlin hotel
to Dr. Puhl, stating that Ambassador Joseph Kennedy had asked him to come to
Berlin so that he could invite Puhl to meet him in Paris to discuss mutual
American-German economic and financial problems. Mooney suggested a meeting in
his own apartment in the Hotel Ritz in Paris for an unobserved rendezvous with
Kennedy, to which Puhl was interested and said that he would take the matter up
with his government. However, on the 3rd Puhl advised Mooney that
because of the conferences he was holding at the time with British and U.S.
bankers in connection with the Dawes Plan payments, he could not make the trip
to Paris without attracting public attention and newspaper surmise, and it
would be better if Dr. Wohlthat went in Puhl’s place. Wohlthat agreed to be in
Paris the following weekend, and Kennedy agreed over the telephone his
willingness to go to Paris. On Thursday 4 May, Mooney left for Antwerp, and
stayed at G.M. Continental the next day, Friday 5 May 1939. Whilst at the
Plant, Ed Zdunek gave a message to Mooney that Kennedy had tried in vain to
reach him by telephone to tell him that Roosevelt had refused approval for
Kennedy’s trip to Paris. Embarrassed by the turn of events, Mooney chartered an
aircraft and flew back to London.[47]
Whilst in transit, Mooney formulated a list of
principal contributions to peace that could be made by Germany and thus which
could be made by the U.K. and the U.S.:
Contributions
by Germany:
1.
Limitation of armaments.
2.
Non-aggression pacts.
3.
Move into trade practices of western nations:
a)
Free exchange
b)
Discontinue subsidised exports
c)
Move into most-favoured nation practices.
d)
Discharge foreign obligations (pay debts).
Contributions
by United Kingdom and United States:
1.
Gold loan of $500,000,000 to $1,000,000,000 @ $4.46 = £112,102,763 to
£224,215,246 and @ RM12.17 to the £, approximately RM1,364,000,000 to
RM2,729,000,000 at “official” average rates, via Bank of International
Settlements in Basle to provide a gold reserve so that orthodox money and price
practices could be set up.
2.
Colonies
3.
Cut out embargoes on German goods
4.
Credits on raw materials
5.
Free access by trade to sources of critical raw materials such as tin and
rubber
6.
Participation in Chinese markets when reopened to Western powers.[48]
Mooney placed the notes on Kennedy’s desk in the
Embassy when he arrived in London, and after reading them Kennedy replied “What
a wonderful speech could be built up from those points back home!”. Kennedy
agreed to get permission from the President again to visit Paris, but the
following day he advised Mooney that he had had a second refusal. Mooney then
asked if it would be possible for Wohlthat to come over to London instead upon
invitation, as in some ways he felt it more hazardous to make the longer trip
to London than to Paris. Wohlthat had to undertake considerable re-arrangement
of plans and had to secure a British visa in order to accept the changed
invitation. Mooney was staying in the Berkeley Hotel in London, and was sent a
telegram stating that Wohlthat would arrive by aeroplane from Berlin in London
about 10 p.m. on Monday 8 May 1939 [he would have flown most probably to
Croydon, though he could also have landed at Heston]. [49]
It appears that Wohlthat had an office at Leifzugen Strasse No.3, Berlin W.8.
The actual Post Office Telegram states that it was received at the Piccadilly,
London Telegraph Office of the G.P.O. on [Saturday] 6 May at the Berkeley
Hotel.[50]
Mooney booked rooms for the German official in the Hotel two floors above his.
Dr. Puhl, Reichsbank director introduced Dr. H.C.H. Wohlthat, Ministerialdirektor in Göering’s office,
by typed note written dated 4 May 1939, which Wohlthat must have brought with
him. Wohlthat had already met Mooney, but presumably in order to effect an
introduction to Kennedy, brought with him a typed resume in German explaining
his responsibilities: Puhl wrote in English.[51]
Late in the morning of Tuesday 9 May Kennedy and
Wohlthat met Mooney in the latter’s apartment. Mooney left them to do the
talking, which they did for about two hours, discussing many phases of the
tangled international problems. After Kennedy left, Wohlthat spent several
hours dictating notes to his secretary, and Mooney and he had dinner together
that night. Mooney expressed some political and economic matters which he was
convinced that Germany had to face if she hoped to come into harmony with
British and American thinking. Wohlthat then returned to Berlin on Wednesday 10
May.
The meeting between the various parties would
certainly have come to the attention of Sir Robert Vansittart, the
germanophobic Diplomatic Adviser to H.M. Government even if there had been no
direct appraisal by his brother Nick Vansittart [by then General Motors
Overseas Operations Division Regional Director for the British Isles], which is
very much doubted. Mooney then left for Paris by Golden Arrow on the morning of 11 May 1939, and probably visited
the Gennevilliers Plant. Just before boarding the train, Mooney was handed a
copy of the Daily Mail, which was
headlined “Göering’s Mystery Man Here”, and beneath was a story of Wohlthat’s
“secret arrival” on a “secret mission”, followed by a denial of any knowledge
of his visit by the German embassy and the paper’s own speculation that
Wohlthat was “taking soundings for new Anglo-German trade discussions”. Despite
guarded arrangements, the whole story had become public, because of the need to
apply for a visa. Whether an interested very senior civil servant had leaked
the information[1], or whether
an astute reporter had picked up the information from the airport is not known.
The reporter could only surmise as to the nature of the mission and by the time
that it appeared in print, the Dr. was back in Berlin beyond the reach of
reporters. Mooney then sailed for New York by ship 25 May 1939 after a short holiday
in Cannes.[52]
The question of the Anglo-German Gold Loan to
Germany was evidently left with Kennedy and Wohlthat, and Mooney played no
further part in the negotiations. Mooney criticised the lack of acquaintance
between Berlin and London and Berlin and Washington, and the lack of
acquaintance between men in corresponding positions in corresponding
governments, with no interchange of thought.[53]
It appears as though the Reichsbank started transferring gold to the Swiss
National Bank in Bern in January 1939. Given the invasion of Czechoslovakia,
and seizure of Czech assets it is extremely unlikely that the U.K. government
would have entertained any contribution to a Gold Loan, even if it could have
been afforded, which is extremely doubtful. However, the principle may not have
been dismissed completely. Schacht’s successor, Dr. Walter Funk gave evidence
to the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg that in the months before
the beginning of the war he concentrated his entire activity on international
negotiations for bringing about a better international economic order, and for
improving commercial relations between Germany and her foreign partners. At
that time it was arranged that the British Ministers Hudson and Stanley were to
visit him in Berlin. The subject of short-term foreign debts had again to be
discussed and settled namely the moratorium. Funk had worked out new proposals
for this, which he claimed were hailed with enthusiasm, especially in England.
In June 1939, an international financial discussion took place in his offices
in Berlin, and leading representatives of the banking world from the United
States, from England, from Holland, France, Belgium, Switzerland, and Sweden,
took part in it, and the discussions led to results that satisfied all parties
or so he claimed. At the same time Funk carried out the exchange or transfer of
Reichsbank assets in foreign countries. This exchange of gold shares was also
considered very fair and satisfactory in foreign banking circles and the
foreign press Funk suggested. Funk also participated in the customary monthly
discussions of the International Clearing Bank at Easel as late as the
beginning of July 1939, and despite the strong political tension which existed
at the time was convinced that a war would be avoided.
3.4 SAILED TO EUROPE AGAIN!
The next event of significance was the General
Motors’ Executive Conference, which ran from 26 July to 28 August 1939, and
which Mooney’s protégé the General Motors Limited Managing Director, F.C.
Lynch, probably attended. Before the end of the Conference, James D. Mooney
sailed on 22 August 1939 from New York to Europe on the S.S. Europa again, presumably a German ship as it was shadowed by a
Royal Navy Cruiser which necessitated taking an extended northerly route north
of the Arctic Circle, and then down the Norwegian Coast. The ship then landed
in Bremerhaven on 29 August from New York.[54]
I propose that Frank Lynch, Mooney’s appointee[55],
took the same ship and they arrived in Bremerhaven together, whereupon Lynch
caught a ship back to the U.K. immediately. Mooney travelled immediately to
Berlin to confer with his business associates in Germany about the status of
G.M.’s properties in the event of war, about the evacuation of G.M. non-German
personnel, and about the various measures possible for the protection of G.M.
Corporations’ investments within the Reich.[56]
Anita Kugler suggests
that Mooney had involved the prominent
Berlin lawyer, Heinrich Richter in the discussions: Richter had been G.M.’s
lawyer since 1934. The Southern Railway’s Solicitor was informed on 31 August 1939 that
Frank Lynch had returned from the U.S. and that the position as regards the
Lease of the Southampton Plant was that “Mr. Lynch states that he has fully
discussed the matter with his Headquarters in America, and it has been decided
that the Lease should be completed and signed as early as possible….A
representative of General Motors will be visiting Antwerp, as soon as he is
able, and on his way hopes to call at Southampton for the purpose of agreeing
the figures, but it is not yet known when this will take place. In the
circumstances, therefore, will you please hasten the preparation and submission
of a draft lease…, and upon hearing from us that the Lease is ready for
signature, Mr. Lynch will cable America, when a special Directors’ meeting will
be held, and they will cable him the necessary authority to sign.” [57]
This description of “a representative” must have been taken to refer to
Vansittart who would have travelled to Antwerp where his family home was
[though he lived also in London], and could have taken the regular ship from
Southampton to Antwerp if it still ran, otherwise he would have gone from Dover
or more likely Folkestone to Oostende [Ostend]. Vansittart was the Regional Director
for the British Isles and thus in theory he was responsible for the final
decisions regarding the Southampton Plant. It is logical that if it was
Vansittart, he was intending to contact Mooney via Antwerp to discuss much the
same as Mooney had travelled to Berlin for, as telephone/telegraphic
connections would have been terminated between the U.K. and Germany. Nick
Vansittart was in overall charge of Vauxhall Motors, Luton and the other
G.M.-owned components companies in London and Dunstable, as well as G.M.
Limited in London and Southampton, and contact with Mooney and Adam Opel could
have been, and was permissible via Belgium.
Vansittart was still a director of Adam Opel A.G. as well as that of G.M.
Continental, so he had a justifiable reason to travel to Antwerp, where he had
a house as well.
Mooney
states that at the outbreak of war, G.M. employed 26,000, “an excellent
cross-section of Germany”. Mooney states that he actually had lunch with Dr
Helmuth Wohlthat on 1 September 1939, i.e. the day that Hitler declared war on
Poland. After about two weeks in Berlin, say therefore around 15 September,
Mooney went to Wiesbaden to examine the position of Adam Opel at nearby
Rüsselsheim. On 21 September 1939, Mooney proceeded [by rail?] to Switzerland
and Italy to be able to communicate freely with General Motors in New York.
This seems to confirm that it was Nick Vansittart who travelled to Antwerp, and
communication could have been made from Antwerp to the G.M. Plant in
Biel/Bienne, or to Rome. Mooney then returned from Italy, presumably via
Switzerland again, to Rüsselsheim around the 13th October [Mooney
says mid-October], and received a long-distance telephone call from Berlin on
14 October from Heinrich Richter. Richter said that he and an American resident
in Berlin had been discussing the war and the proposal had been made by a
German official that it would be most useful if someone like himself could be
interested in an attempt to bring about the end of the war, and also whether he
could ascertain if President Roosevelt would be interested in initiating a
proposal that hostilities cease. Mooney said that he would motor to Berlin the
following day to discuss. However, that day, namely 14 October, Mooney
telephoned his “trusted friend”, Edward C. Riley[58],
Assistant General Manager, G.M.O.O. [then two rungs down the ladder from
Mooney], acquainted him of the proposal concerning the President, and requested
that Riley contact the White House. Riley cabled Mooney “a few days later” [not
correct: see below] stating that Basil O’Connor, unofficial adviser to, and
former law partner of Franklin D. Roosevelt, had ventured the opinion that he
should acquaint U.S. Ambassador William C. Bullitt in Paris with the matter,
and if Bullitt approved of the principle, then Roosevelt might give it
sympathetic consideration as well. Mooney acknowledged and approved Riley’s
advice[59].
Mooney in fact called Riley in the early afternoon of Saturday 14 October 1939,
at home in Pennsylvania, from Wiesbaden.
Riley then discussed the matter with George Woolf, President of U.S.
Steel Export over the telephone that afternoon, and then in the evening Woolf
rang Riley to say that he had in turn discussed the matter with Mr Ed
Stettinius. The latter had suggested that there was no better man to take up
the question that O’Connor. Riley arranged a meeting with O’Connor in his
apartment at 20.00, Sunday evening October 15 in New York. Sunday morning,
Riley telephoned Stettinius in Virginia and he expressed his views, which
confirmed the understanding received from Woolf. The meeting with O’Connor lasted two hours, and afterwards a
cable was sent in cryptic terms to Mooney. The cable was received Monday 16
October, and Mooney then cabled Riley back on receipt.[60]
On 19 September 1939 a meeting was held in Berlin between Göering, Luftwaffe Generals Udent and Milch,
Heinrich Koppenburg the chief executive of Junkers, and General von Schell of
the Wehrmacht. Schell was
“Plenipotentiary for the Vehicle Industry in the Four-Year Plan”. It was agreed
that the Brandenburg plant should continue producing Blitz trucks for the Wehrmacht leaving Rüsselsheim for the
Junkers parts production program. The following day the details of conversion
of Rüsselsheim to Ju-88 parts production were set out at the offices of the
southern Hessian regional “Military Economy Inspectorate” for war production
and resource allocation in Wiesbaden: Wehrwirtschaftsinspektion
X111 at which Heinrich Wagner represented Opel [the production manager at
Rüsselsheim]. Mooney was in Wiesbaden at the time but Cyrus C. Osborn, chief
managing officer, may have been involved in the negotiations. Immediately after
the meeting Rüsselsheim began converting to war production and then two days
after Mooney left for Switzerland on 22 and 23 September, Adam Opel A.G.
allegedly purchased RM 10 million in German equities which was supposed to have
been approved by the Corporation’s Policy Committee of which Mooney was a
member, on 16 January 1940.[61]
Mooney
motored to Berlin and saw Richter, Sunday afternoon on 15 October at the Adlon
Hotel. He learned that Dr. Otto Dietrich who was the P.R. chief of the German
government and Hitler’s personal press representative, had suggested the
desirability of American mediation between Germany and U.K. & France, to Louis
P. Lochner, chief of bureau of The Associated Press in Berlin. Lochner was an
American, a fervent anti-Nazi, and Pulitzer Prize winner for distinguished
foreign correspondents. Lochner then mentioned the proposal to Richter, with
whom he was associated on the board of directors of the American Chamber of
Commerce in Germany. Richter was a lawyer for a number of large American
concerns and would thus probably know of someone who had the calibre that
Dietrich was after. Richter suggested Mooney, and Dietrich approved. Dietrich,
being a member of the handful of close men with the right and power of Immediat-Vortrag, or Immediate Report,
must have had the ear or backing of Hitler. The following day, 16 October,
Lochner agreed that that it would be wise for Mooney to see Dr. Helmuth
Wohlthat again. Wohlthat was Ministerial-Direktor
in Göering’s special economics ministry. In this position he was charged with
chief responsibility for the effective execution of the Four-Year Plan. Mooney
then telephoned Wohlthat, who invited him to have dinner that evening. They
then discussed the problems of war and peace for several hours, and then
suggested that Mooney meet with Göering. Wohlthat made an appointment for
Mooney to see the Field Marshall at noon on Thursday 19 October. The night
before, Wednesday 18 October, Wohlthat and Mooney discussed at length the
international politic and economic situation.[62]
Mooney had an audience with Göering in Berlin on
Thursday 19 October 1939, over 3 hours from noon, and in attendance was Dr.
Helmuth Wohlthat who translated for Mooney where required. Mooney had already
met the Field Marshall in June 1936 at the U.S. Embassy. The U.S. Ambassador in
Berlin, Hugh Wilson, suggested that Mooney wear his decoration given him in
1938. Göering stated that Germany was willing to give every reasonable
guarantee that she would not molest the Empire if Great Britain would not
meddle with Germany’s affairs. Some sort of Monroe doctrine for the Empire
might be recognised by Germany. “…. fundamentally Germany would like nothing
more than to be on good terms with the Empire”.[63]
The Reich was perfectly willing to co-operate with the Empire idea, and willing
to assure or guarantee the integrity of the British Empire.[64]
Mooney states that he learnt subsequently that the meeting was with the full
knowledge and concurrence of Hitler. Göering then urged Mooney to travel to the
U.K. and find out what the war was about and whether the British wanted to
fight. Göering also agreed to a meeting in a neutral country, by
representatives of the two countries: even the Field Marshall agreed to go if
necessary.[65]
After the meeting with Göering, Mooney apparently
intended to pay a “purely friendly visit” to Schacht, who was at the time “in
the doghouse” with the Nazis. However, he was at that time living on his farm
some distance from Berlin and so they were not destined to met again. On
Friday, 19 October, Mooney left for Paris to see Ambassador Bullitt[66],
apparently via Aachen and the Belgian border, and thence to the French border
[by train?]. Before he had left Berlin, Mooney had called on Alexander Kirk,
Charge d’Affaires in the U.S. Embassy, who then telephoned Bullitt to say that
Mooney was on his way to Paris. Mooney must have gone via Brussels as he asked
his close associate of 25 years, M. Paul Cousin, the French-born G.M. dealer in
Brussels, to accompany him to Paris. Mooney arrived in Paris on Sunday 22
October, which suggests that he had spent at least two days in Belgium: he
could have met Nick Vansittart, Nick’s colleague the Regional Director for West
Europe A.J. Wieland, Antwerp’s General Manager Ed Zdunek in Antwerp or
Brussels. The Southampton Lease had still not been signed at this point, and
the Canadian representatives of the Department of National Defence had been, or
were still inspecting the Southampton plant and British motor industry.[67]
Mooney received a lunch invitation when he arrived
in Paris from Bullitt, but was unable to attend. He therefore called at the
Embassy the next day. Whilst he was there, Ambassador Kennedy rang from London
and Mooney explained that he was coming back to London again. There were
various meetings with Bullitt, including when Bullitt saw the British
Ambassador in Paris off back to London.[68]
The British Ambassador was in fact Sir Eric Phipps, the brother-in-law of both
Sir Robert and Nick Vansittart. Mooney may have already known Phipps: he was
British Ambassador in Berlin (1933-37) and in Paris (1937-39. He gained a
reputation as a staunch anti-Nazi and an 'anti-appeaser' in Berlin, and as a
'defeatist-appeaser' in Paris. Bullitt apparently cabled the State Department
in Washington, and raised the strongest objections to Mooney being involved in
any peace mission.[69]
Cousin was in touch with a government official
close to the French Prime Minister, Daladier, and advised Mooney that the P.M.
could see Mooney on 24 hours’ notice, though Mooney felt he ought to hurry to
London, the general gist having been expressed to Daladier.
Mooney left Paris for London himself on the
evening of Wednesday 25 October 1939, although evidently Bullitt thought the
peace mission foolish and probably rang Kennedy to tell him so. He arrived in
London the same evening: did he fly over therefore? He then met or telephoned
Nick Vansittart, and explained his mission immediately on arrival. Vansittart was most sympathetic and offered
to enlist the aid of his brother, Sir Robert to meet the appropriate British
officials.[70] Given the
information network at his disposal, even in late 1939, Sir Robert probably
knew already of the mission and would certainly have known that Mooney was in
the country via Special Branch, or through Phipps.
Mooney met Joseph Kennedy, U.S. Ambassador in
London, in the morning of Thursday 26 October 1939. Kennedy said that he refused
to have any part in the “damned affair”, and expressed his vehement objection
to the mission. It appears that Bullitt had telephoned Kennedy and echoed his
comments to the State Department directly to his counterpart in London.
“My
record showed me to be no pacifist….should the United States be compelled to
fight Germany, I was quite ready to do my part in the fray and had, in fact,
already made my preparations for that eventuality”.
Mooney explained that he though that the
British ought to be given the opportunity of hearing Göering’s proposal and
reject it if it seemed unreasonable, before the real slaughter got under way.
After ten minutes, Kennedy thought that Mooney should see [the Foreign
Secretary] Lord Halifax straightaway.[71]
Mooney returned to his hotel, where he found Nick Vansittart waiting for him.
Sir Alexander Cadogan as Permanent Secretary in the Foreign Office had replaced
Sir Robert Vansittart as Diplomatic Adviser to H.M. Government and had to
present matters to higher authorities before making statements or commitments
[i.e. to Cadogan and Halifax]. One of Sir Robert’s responsibilities was that of
contacting carriers of missions, and Mooney was one of them. Nick Vansittart
immediately telephoned his brother Sir Robert and made an appointment for
Mooney to see Sir Robert that afternoon. At Mooney’s request, Nick Vansittart
accompanied him to the Foreign Office on Thursday 26 October 1939. During the
interview, Mooney told Sir Robert the complete story of the mission, how he
became involved, discussions in Berlin, and of conversations with Göering.
Specific details of Göering’s principal points of interest were conveyed
including the German attitude on the British Empire. Mooney also advised Sir
Robert of Wohlthat’s intimations that arrangements could be made for an
alteration in the German government to avoid having to have discussions with
Hitler. Further, that Göering would meet any British representative in a
foreign country if necessary. Mooney states
that he repeated consistently to find reason for supporting a refusal in
meeting to discuss peace. Sir Robert asked pertinent and penetrating questions,
and made meticulous notes on everything said to him: Mooney claims that Sir
Robert was the only man in London or subsequently in Washington, who seemed to
be intelligently interested in the German position, in their attitude of mind,
or in conditions in Germany.[72]
Sir Robert apparently advised Halifax that “Mr. Mooney was being used by
Göering, but that he was personally honest”.[73]
“It
was one of the ironies of my experience during those first years of World War
II, that, despite their knowledge of my visits to Germany since war was
declared, few Americans or Englishmen in public life appeared to be interested
in obtaining any information I might possess….. Although I was in the unusual
position of knowing a great deal about what was going on behind the scenes in
Europe, and in Germany particularly, almost no one asked me for first-hand
political or military facts which I might have provided”.[74]
Two evenings later, on 28 October, Ambassador
Kennedy’s [male] secretary telephoned Mooney to inform him that Kennedy had
revealed the story of the mission to Lord Beaverbrook, who wanted to see Mooney
as soon as possible. Nick Vansittart was in Mooney’s room when the call was
received, and both he and Mooney were angry about the unexpected development.
They immediately telephoned Sir Robert, explained what had happened, and asked
for his assistance in blocking any further revelations. Mooney assured Sir
Robert that he had no intention of discussing the subject with anyone outside
the F.O., and especially not with a newspaper proprietor. Deep regret was
expressed at the “unfortunate betrayal of confidence”. Mooney then dropped in
on Sir Robert on the next day, Sunday 29 October. Sir Robert was still greatly
annoyed over Kennedy’s disclosures to Beaverbrook, and as a consequence
ventured a few remarks about Kennedy’s ineptitude. Afterwards, Sir Robert
paused to reflect and suggested that it was appropriate for Mooney to send a
message back to Germany saying that he had arrived in England and was
delivering the message. The two men then worked on the wording of the message
to be sent. A Belgian “business
executive associated over a long period years with G.M.” and well acquainted
with the manager of the Belgian operations [who was Ed Zdunek, a former U.S.
Marine] was leaving for Belgium that evening. Who this is, is unknown: could it
have been Paul Cousin, the Brussels G.M. dealer? The written note was handed to
Zdunek, and then transmitted to Germany through private channels.[75]
Costello claims that Halifax had instructed Sir Robert to send word back to
Berlin that Göering’s message was being considered seriously by the British
Government. The Foreign Office stalled Mooney’s meeting with Halifax until
after the U.S. Congress had voted to amend the Neutrality Acts to allow the
U.S. to supply arms and equipment to the Allies on a cash-and-carry.
Roosevelt’s move to permit the cash-and-carry trade was backed by the Democrats
but opposed by the Republicans. On 2 November 1939, the Senate approved the
amendment by a 2:1 margin.[76]
On 1 November 1939, Nick Vansittart was called
to the Foreign Office and specifically requested to go without Mooney. On
return from seeing Sir Robert Vansittart, Nick told him as delicately as
possible without betraying a confidence that Mooney’s proposal had struck a
barrier because of another peace effort about to be made by a neutral. This
latter effort required a good deal of consultation in the Foreign Office and
Nick was to pass on the message that this was the main reason why Mooney would
have to be kept waiting a few days more. Very shortly thereafter, Queen
Wilhelmina of The Netherlands [a Lincoln owner] and King Leopold of the Belgians
offered their services as joint mediators in the conflict, and this had come as
a complete surprise in London. This was
not the one that the proposal that caused the delay, and Mooney never did find
out whose overtures had caused the delay. Then, a further confidential report
came to Nick Vansittart from his brother, stating that the French Ambassador in
London had been informed of Mooney’s reason for being in the U.K. and this was
making it difficult for the British government to decide how to proceed, so
could Mooney hang on a while longer still? Sir Robert then suggested that
Mooney sent a second message to Berlin to the effect that definite word would
be received shortly. Nick Vansittart
and Mooney both concluded that it was very notable that Sir Robert had
suggested twice that he ought to send a message back to Berlin that the message
was being considered seriously. Further, there was an impression that there
should be no blunder caused by the mere fact of a delay in Mooney’s return. On
the day of Sir Robert’s second suggestion, which must have been Thursday 3
November, a message was received which was relayed from Germany through private
channels [presumably via Antwerp again] asking when Mooney was expected back in
Berlin. The strict wartime regulations stated that no letters or written
messages could be carried by anyone. No risks could be taken with this second
message, and it therefore required a verbal message conveyed to Belgium for
onward relay to Berlin.[77]Chamberlain
rejected the Leopold/Wilhelmina offer of mediation on 7 November.[78]
Nick Vansittart and Mooney discussed all
possible candidates for the mission, as it was important that the messenger was
in a position to leave and then return to England. The logical choice was Frank
Carlos Lynch, Managing Director of General Motors Limited, and Mooney’s
“poodle”, who just happened to be in London from Southampton. Lynch may have
been genuinely visiting the Headquarters in St. James’s Square, or he might
have been calling on Mooney.[79]
As an American, Lynch could easily obtain permission to leave the U.K., enter
Belgium, and then re-enter the country with the legitimate excuse of having
business matters to transact with G.M. Continental in Antwerp. The next boat to
leave for Belgium was 36 hours later, and so Mooney and Nick Vansittart had to
work quickly to obtain visas, exit permit and reservations. Lynch came to the hotel, and then had
committed to memory the first message already sent via the Belgian businessman,
and then the second that Lynch was to pass on. Lynch was given explicit
instructions as to whom he was to see, when and where, and how he was to act on
his arrival. This exercise was rehearsed the first night, and repeated at
breakfast the next day, with a second rehearsal the next night. Lynch was then
assured that if authorities detained him, “we” [Mooney and Vansittart] could
eventually get him released. Riley must have left by train to Folkestone
evening of Thursday 3 November. At the port, the sailing was delayed by several
hours and checking and re-checking of passports of many passengers on the ship
delayed the sailing even after official clearance had been given. Two men and
their baggage were taken off the ship, and then it sailed. Presumably the
sailing had to be at night for safety reasons, and would have taken him to
Oostende. The ship landed safely, the message was put through to Berlin, and
after considerable “wire-pulling” Lynch obtained a return visa quickly. He then
caught a plane in Brussels, landed at Brighton [must have been Shoreham
airfield], and was back in London [by train?] on the evening of Saturday 6
November 1939. Mooney found out on Lynch’s arrival that the first messenger had
got through all right, and passed on his message, and that the second was being
passed on that day as well. Word came back the next day, Sunday 7 November,
that the message had actually been sent to Germany.[80]
Mooney arranged for his own departure for the
Continent on Friday 11 November. However, on Thursday 10 November, Mooney was
granted an interview by Lord Halifax, the Foreign Secretary. It lasted just 15
minutes as Halifax had already had two weeks to consider the matter and had
evidently discussed it thoroughly with Sir Robert and others [which would have
included Cadogan]. Halifax said that Britain could not entertain a peace
proposal at that time because Chamberlain and he did not trust Hitler and von
Ribbentrop, and [given with great emphasis] the country would lose face
politically if any discussions were entered into, as this would be regarded as
another “Munich”. Halifax and Chamberlain had “gone out on a limb” in their
public declarations and could not then recede by talking peace. On his way out,
Halifax told Mooney that Sir Robert would give him the exact answer to take to
Germany.[81]
Mooney felt that Chamberlain and Halifax had been so savagely criticised after
Munich that they did not dare retreat from their insistence that Hitler and
Ribbentrop had to be removed before there could be any peace discussions.[82]
Nick Vansittart and Mooney went to see Sir
Robert to obtain the promised official answer, on the morning of Friday 11
November, Armistice Day. The message was written and on Sir Robert’s desk, but
Mooney was not allowed to see it. Instead, Sir Robert read it out loud three of
four times until Mooney could fully commit it to memory. The message stated
that Mooney’s message had been delivered and listened to with interest. No
progress could be made until there was a government in Germany with which the
British could deal with. Mooney and Nick Vansittart rushed from the Foreign
Office the short distance to Limited’s Headquarters at 3 St. James’s Square and
there the message was written down by each of them with memories checked for
the exact wording. Until Mooney left the country, he carried the words in the
bottom of his shoe as he went around London, repeating to himself the wording
until he was satisfied that he had memorised them exactly. On the train to
Folkestone, the text was checked and memorised and then the paper was torn up
and flushed down the toilet. [83]
3.6
MISSION TO GERMANY, ITALY AND SPAIN!
Mooney left England via Dover late on the 11th,
and said that he had to concentrate his thoughts on encounters with customs
officials and secret service officers at the borders, especially as someone
travelling from one country into an enemy one was scrutinised carefully, and a
traveller who went back and forth frequently awakened especial suspicion.
Mooney says that he was frequently subjected to long questioning, but was
always able to prove that he was genuinely travelling as G.M. had plants on
both sides of the conflict and the intelligence officers were soon satisfied
and allowed him to pass through. When Mooney arrived at Folkestone, the Special
Branch me satisfied themselves after checking his name on their lists and books
that he was not a suspicious character. However, one of them confided that they
had had news that morning and the Germans were moving into Belgium, and by the
time that Mooney arrived in Oostende, the Germans would be on their way to
Brussels. The information of course turned out to be totally false! The steam
ferry was one of the few that ran at odd times between Folkestone and the
Belgian port, and the main hazard was the danger of being damaged by mines. Mines
had been laid along the Atlantic and Channel coasts as soon as war broke out,
and four out of five coastal packets hit a mine and sank. The ship headed
straight from Folkestone across to the French coast, and then hugged the shore
until off Calais a German bomber appeared. Luckily, French Anti-aircraft
batteries opened up on the raider and the aircraft flew off.[84]
The ferry landed safely in Belgium, and
presumably Mooney went straight through to the German border and thence to
Berlin, arriving Saturday 12 November 1939. Mooney went to see Wohlthat
straight away, but he was not in his office. Dr. Hahn, his assistant, was
mysterious about his chief’s whereabouts and when he was likely to return. Hahn
suggested that Mooney saw Göering instead. Mooney insisted, however, that the
message was in English and had to be delivered to the German government in the
same tongue, to avoid misconstruction and misunderstanding. The next day, 13
November, Hahn told Mooney that Wohlthat was expected to be in Rome about the end
of that week and he could be met there if Mooney was prepared to go to Italy.
Mooney discussed the matter with Louis Lochner, who promised to see that there
would be no slip-up in Berlin in his plan for meeting Wohlthat in Rome. Mooney
kept in indirect contact by telephone via Switzerland when in Rome: it is
assumed that Mooney used to call the G.M. offices in Bienne, and they then
passed on the message. Mooney then travelled from Berlin by train through
Switzerland to Rome, arriving on Wednesday 16 November, but there was no sign
of the German minister. However, Hahn sent an airmail letter urging Mooney to
be patient and assuring that Wohlthat would be arriving shortly and staying at
the Hotel Eden. Two weeks later, the German had still not arrived, but a German
courier arrived at Mooney’s rooms at the Ambasciators Hotel. Mooney was
presented with a plain envelope, and inside that was another and then another,
which ultimately contained a letter from Wohlthat addressed to Mooney from the
Hotel Ritz in Madrid. This was a surprise as Mooney had been told indirectly
that the German was in Istanbul. The letter requested that Mooney stay there
for a few more days, but Wohlthat never arrived. Mooney ran into a retired U.S.
Naval officer, Commander Riggs on his way back to the U.S. via Rome. Mooney
asked Riggs to fly to Madrid and see what was happening with Wohlthat. Early on
Saturday, 9 December 1939, Mooney received a cable message from Riggs saying
that the German minister had to remain in Madrid for a few more days and that
if Mooney would care to fly over and spend the Sunday with him, he would be
happy for Mooney to do so.[85]
Mooney flew to Spain and then took a train to
Madrid, arriving Sunday morning, 10 December. They met at the Ritz and then had
lunch, followed by a car drive around the city to see the Civil War damage.[86]
They returned to the Ritz for lunch, talked to midnight, and then met the next
morning until noon when Mooney flew to Seville to make connections with an
Italian aircraft for Lisbon. This would make it Monday 11 December. Wohlthat
listened to everything that Mooney had to say, but the German reversed his
previous sentiments and replied that it was now too late for any realignment in
the German government. The impression was given that something had happened
since they met weeks previously. Costello suggests that this “event” was a
searing attack on Hitler broadcast by Churchill on 19 November[87].
Rejection of Göering’s offer of talks meant that the Germans had no alternative
than to “bomb hell out of” the British fleet and all of the strategic military
points, ports and harbours “of England”. Mooney thought this a mistake as this
would increase ill-wishers of Germany in the world and that Britain had many
friends particularly the U.S. and Germany was interested in re-establishing
peace as well as any of the great nations, and she could not afford a long war.
Germany’s national interests lay in re-attainment of peace because her most
desperate need was the standard of living improvements through industrial
development. The two parted, the German staying on in Madrid for negotiations
of a new treaty with General Franco and his cabinet, which had already dragged
on for weeks and which were entangled by Spanish habits. Mooney returned to
Seville, caught the Lisbon plane, and on Wednesday 13 December left Portugal by
Pan-American Clipper flying-boat for New York, arriving Thursday 14 December
1939. The aircraft probably went via
The Azores and the “southern route”.[88]
Mooney had left New York 22 August and arrived back nearly four months later!
3.7
RETURN TO NEW YORK
The Lease of the Southampton Plant was signed on 22 November 1939, nearly
a year after the official opening. F.C. Lynch, Nick Vansittart and Fred Beard,
the Secretary signed the deed to witness the company seal being affixed.
Mooney’s “poodle”, Lynch’s assignment at an end, on 20 December 1939, he formally resigned as
Managing Director and Director of General Motors Limited and was replaced by a
Briton, Reginald Cartwright. Lynch presumably flew back to the U.S., but we
cannot be sure whether he went by sea instead [from Liverpool?]. Mrs. Dorothy
Rylands, then Miss Brook, the Treasurer’s Secretary in Southampton in 1939
remembers Lynch and confirms that he left the country as quickly as possible,
and his rented house was taken over by her boss instead. He may therefore have
taken a flying boat back.[89]
On reaching New York, Lynch was appointed Mooney’s assistant for several
months.
When Mooney had
arrived in New York he hoped to establish a personal contact with President
Roosevelt, to acquaint him with some of Mooney’s first-hand experiences. He
also wanted to meet Basil O’Connor to thank him for his interest and advice and
to enlist his help in getting the ear of the President. Ed Riley made an
appointment for Mooney and himself to see O’Connor in his apartment in the
evening of Sunday, 17 December 1939. The discussion lasted until nearly
midnight, and it was agreed that it would be to everyone’s advantage, including
the U.S. that the war was brought to a swift end. O’Connor was thanked for his
assistant and advice through Riley, and suggested that he had information that
would surely be of interest and potential value to the President. O’Connor
decided that he would consider the matters that had been discussed and advise
Mooney in due course whether he could assist further. A day or two later,
Mooney was advised that an appointment had been made for him to see Roosevelt
on Friday 22 December.[2]
The Press never found out why Mooney was in Washington for some reason. Mooney
states that he was a registered Democrat and had been at the White House at
various times to talk about commercial affairs with the President[3].
Further, it was generally known that Mooney was engaged in international trade:
he was therefore seemingly just another industrialist of no political
significance. [90]
The interview
with the President lasted more than 1½ hours and the discussion included the
foreign political situation, details of negotiations in Berlin and London, and
the trip through Europe. Back at his Washington hotel, Mooney wrote his notes
of the conversation. Roosevelt stated that as Democrats, he and Mooney both
believed in a liberal tariff policy [if not Free Trade!], but did not believe
that some of the schemes that were being discussed to abolish tariffs entirely
in Europe were practicable. Governments needed tariffs for revenue purposes
[good point], and it would be better to open up a broader distribution of goods
and raw materials gradually rather than through radical changes. Tariff
barriers had to be reduced and trade relations improved remarkably in Europe
because in any discussions of a peace formula, it was necessary to provide some
means of furnishing employment for those who were involved in armaments programmes.
In recent years, especially the two previous ones, the armaments industry had
been used for employment [soak up unemployment] because industry and trade had
been so badly hit by the many restrictions placed on the flow of international
trade. The President would, inter alia,
like a scheme for making raw materials more readily available, e.g. copper from
the Congo as a material that could be made in a broader way for Europe and the
countries that wanted copper.[91]
On 19 December 1939 a directors’ and managers’ meeting was held in
Rüsselsheim [or Berlin?] to discuss the ongoing conversion to war production.
C.R. Osborn, the chief executive of Adam Opel A.G. was appointed a director and
served as deputy to the Chairman, Wilhelm von Opel Heinrich Wagner was
designated the new chief executive leading a management board of six Germans.
The new board consisted of Osborn, Sloan, Mooney, Graeme K. Howard, and Elis
“Pete” Hoglund, plus Albin Madsen the director of G.M. International and a
further Dutch director, plus von Opel, Consul Franz Berlitz, attorney from
Dresdner Bank.[92] However,
the 1940 list of directors the President Professor Dr Karl Lüer, and David
“Dave” Ladin who was also with International. Nick Vansittart who had been a
director since 1938 was removed from the board at the meeting.
4.0 THE LAST CHANCE FOR PEACE?
4.1 MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT
Mooney took a
short vacation in Florida, and then had accumulated business matters on his
return to New York, which kept him occupied for most of January 1940. Frank
Lynch returned to New York and would have assisted Mooney in G.M. business as a
consequence. In the meantime, O’Connor and Riley kept in touch with each other
and discussed the possibility of a second talk with the President. Another
meeting was scheduled for Wednesday 24 January, with the “Phoney War” at its
height[4].
A few days before the visit, O’Connor suggested to Mooney that it would be a
good idea for him to go abroad again and secure expressions from the heads of
the belligerent states as to their war aims and terms which they would consider
acceptable as a basis for peace discussions. Roosevelt thought that this would
be successful only if Mooney disguised it as an ordinary business trip on the
lines of those he was in the habit of making. Before Mooney left New York for
Washington, he made reservations on two or three steamships. Mooney met
Roosevelt again at 11.00 on 24 January and stated that he was planning to sale
for Naples on the Conte di Savoia
[Count of Savoy], leaving on 3 February.[93]
It was agreed that the trip was to be disguised as a business one, and he was
to have an ordinary passport, not a diplomatic one. A letter amounting to an
informal credential was handed to Mooney when he got back to New York, signed
by Roosevelt and dated 24 January.[94]
Just as he was
leaving the White House, Mooney suggested that he ought to go over to the State
Department and see Secretary of State Cordell Hull. Roosevelt agreed, but when
Mooney arrived at the Department, Hull was ill at home. The next man down in
charge was George W. Messersmith whom Mooney had known for years in Europe, and
so Hull’s secretary took him to see the no.2 man. However, Messersmith was
totally against the trip and thought it highly dangerous. However, Mooney
insisted that the President had wanted him to make the trip, and asked for help
getting a passport. Messersmith knew
all about the aspects of the trip between Berlin and London, and also pulled
out in Mooney’s presence the cablegram from Bullitt sent the previous October.
Arguably using the text of the cable, Messersmith launched a violent attack on
the planned trip, which resulted in a heated argument. Mooney stated that he
was going as he had told the President, and the least that Messersmith could do
was co-operate and provide the privilege of using diplomatic pouches for
transmission of reports to the President. The interview ended, and Messersmith
walked along the hall with Mooney to the passport division. However, relations
with the State Department on the whole subject of the trip were decidedly
unfavourable and jealousy by career diplomats was responsible for the
opposition to the mission. If Hull had not been ill, then Mooney could have
talked personally to him and an effective and mutually satisfactory arrangement
could have been reached. However, the previous year, Graeme K. Howard, General
Manager, General Motors Overseas Operations Group, and a Corporation
Vice-president, Mooney’s No.2 had openly attacked Hull’s trade programme for
its opposition to Germany’s efforts at bilateral trade policies and the State
Department for not making agreements under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act
with “have-not” nations. This surely would not have endeared Hull to Mooney?
Events then took an interesting turn: on Mooney’s return to New York he
discussed his difficulties with the State Department at a dinner with O’Connor
and Riley, and it was agreed that another effort should be made to see Hull
before leaving for Italy. Charles W. Taussig, a personal friend of Cordell Hull
and State Department adviser suggested that Mooney returned to Washington on
Tuesday 30 January only to find Hull was still ill. Mooney decided to see
Adolph Berle, Assistant Secretary of State instead, and asked him to inform
U.S. embassies of his plan so that in the event of a need for assistance, he
could use their message transmission and code facilities. Berle resented the
mission, and anybody and everybody who had something to offer. Nothing
constructive “ever came out of my conversations with him”. Berle promised to
send word to the ambassadors as requested, but Mooney subsequently wondered if
he ever did.[95]
With the
hostility of the professional diplomats, Mooney felt that he needed another
means of safe and confidential means of communicating with the President, and
as Mooney was a Naval Reserve Officer, he arranged for Captain Wallace Lind and
through him, Rear-Admiral W.B. Andersen, director of Naval Intelligence to make
another avenue available for communications. Lind presented Mooney to Andersen
who, the moment he was informed of the task to be undertaken and the need for a
safe means of communication, gave Mooney letters to the naval attaches in
London and Rome, namely Captain Allan G. Kirk and T.C. Kincaid, respectively.
He also wrote directly to the officers, as well as to Rear-Admiral Charles E.
Courtney, squadron commander, U.S. naval forces in Lisbon, instructing them to
give Mooney fullest co-operation. Mooney also called upon Archbishop Francis
Joseph Spellman, of the Diocese of New York, to enlist his support. Spellman
arranged a contact with Pope Pius X to enable Mooney to have a private audience
in case he needed the Pope’s help at any point [Mooney being a non-regular
Church attending Catholic]. Mooney then called on a friend of the family, Rt.
Rev. Msgr. Charles J. Canivan, rector of St. Dominic’s R.C. church at Oyster
Bay, near the Mooney’s Long Island, NY, home. The priest agreed to say special
prayers each day for the mission’s success until Mooney returned.[96]
4.2 SAILS TO ITALY
Mooney sailed
from New York on the Italian liner, Conte
di Savoia, as planned, bound for Naples, accompanied by Mooney’s executive
assistant, William B. Wachtler, a vice-president of General Motors Overseas
Operations. In February, whilst en route for Italy, Ed Riley cabled Mooney on
board saying that the President was sending Under-secretary of State Sumner
Welles to Europe to survey conditions in Italy, France, Germany and the U.K. in
the name of the United States. Statements made to Welles were to be received
solely by Roosevelt and Hull. Mooney was shocked that the President had
arranged to send an official mission of observation over much of the same
ground as his. Mooney believed after contemplation that the President had
agreed to the Welles mission solely upon the instigation of the State
Department and that the professionals made the appointment against the
infringement by an amateur in their territory. [97]
Mooney resolved to place any information that he had at Welles’s disposal.
The ship landed at Naples on 12 February, and Nick
Vansittart [no longer a director
of Adam Opel but still Regional Director for the British Isles and a director
of the British G.M. companies] and “Ed” Zdunek, Managing Director of G.M. Continental, Antwerp met
Mooney when he arrived! They had been requested to meet Mooney as he wished to
discuss with them “such phases of my mission as would require their
co-operation”. This required making advance preparations for Mooney’s later
arrival in England as well as in Belgium and France. The four men then
travelled by car to Rome, and Captain Kincaid arranged to put the Navy mail
pouch at his disposal and also offered to encode and transmit any messages that
were to be sent back to the President. Mooney also called on U.S. Ambassador Phillips
on the 13th as well, who had, as was expected, not received any word
from the State Department about his trip. However, Mooney decided not to have
an audience with the Pope at that time, and notified a Vatican official to whom
Mooney had been given a letter of introduction from the Archbishop Spellman,
that he would not be taking the Pope’s time at that juncture.[98]
4.3 TRAIN TO GERMANY
On 13 February 1940, Mooney and Wachtler took the
evening train for Munich from Rome [through Austria and the Brenner Pass
presumably]. What happened to Zdunek is not known: Zdunek was back in Antwerp
at the beginning of May though Nick Vansittart returned to the U.K. without Mooney. He understandably reported to his
brother, who in turn sent a Memo. to Halifax on 16 February, thus suggesting
that Nick had arrived back by the 15th. Sir Robert advised Halifax
that Sumner Welles’ mission was to check up on the reports of the diplomatists
and Mr. Mooney will be checking up on Mr. Sumner Welles”. Halifax apparently
allowed his distaste for Americans to show in his comment in the margin “They
are strange people and pursue strange methods!”[99] The Foreign Office files that refer to
Sumner Welles’s mission are in the Public Records Office in Kew under PRO
FO371/24405 to 24408, and Mooney is referred to in 24418 and possibly 24419. Upon arrival in Munich, noon
of 14 February, the train was met as arranged by Cyrus R. Osborn, General
Manager of Adam Opel A.G., and Heinrich Richter. There Mooney met Dr. Fritz
Belitz, a Munich banker who was also a board member of Opel, who came to call
on them. Belitz was another that was very concerned at the unsatisfactory
relations between Germany and the U.S. Osborn and Richter were acquainted with
the mission on the train from Munich to Berlin after the train left in the
evening in a heavy snowstorm, and the train arrived in Berlin two hours late.
In the capital, snow was piled high on the streets. Whilst in Munich, Mooney
arranged for a meeting over the telephone with Alexander Kirk, the Charge
d’Affaires in Berlin. Mooney met him at 11.00, February 15 and acquainted him
with the general circumstances and broad purposes of the trip. They had already
met before Mooney left for Paris the year before. Kirk tried to work out in his
mind any relationship between Mooney’s trip and the impending mission by
Welles. The following day, 16 February, Mooney visited Louis P. Lochner at home
[in Giesebrechtstrasse?] taking in a package of coffee, fruit, chocolate and
soap bought in Italy as Germany was on strict rations at the time. Lochner was
brought up to date and shown the President’s letter, and offered his assistance
with the mission. [100]
It should be mentioned here that Mooney was not the
only man involved in peace missions: James Lonsdale Bryans was an Old Etonian
and had met Lord Halifax in August 1939 when visiting the Foreign Office. After
war had broken out, Lonsdale Bryans left for Rome and after a time made contact
with a junior Italian official who was engaged to the daughter of Ulrich von
Hassell. The Briton was told all about the planned coup that involved his
future father-in-law, and various German Generals. Lonsdale Bryans then
returned to the U.K. and met Halifax, etc. He then travelled to Switzerland
where he met von Hassell himself on 22 February 1940. On return to the U.K.
with a message from von Hassell concerning the ant-Hitler plot, he met various
Foreign Office officials including Sir Robert Vansittart. Evidently, Lonsdale
Bryans’s amateur mission seemed not only pointless but positively dangerous.
Sir Robert sent a Memorandum to Lord Halifax, as Foreign Secretary on 11 March
insisting that neither the Generals “nor anybody else can or will deliver the
goods or revolution”. In support of this he cited soundings taken by his
intelligence agent and former colleague Colonel Malcolm Graham Christie, a
co-director of the private intelligence company “front”, Vansittart &
Christie Limited. Christie had been in communication from Switzerland with
members of the anti-Hitler opposition inside Germany. Sir Robert thought that
it was a “doomed experiment” to negotiate with the Germans “whether the Will
o’the Wisp dances in the name of phantom Generals or of a fat Field Marshal
with a neutral go between”. The latter referred to feelers from Göering through
a Shell-Mex oil executive, Baldwin Reaper. [101]If
this applied to an amateur Briton, and an approach from Göering through Reaper,
it must also have applied to Mooney’s activities as well.
In February 1940, Junkers aero-engines and cockpits
and canopies for the Ju.88 as well as running gear, frame components, and
electrical harnesses with instrument panels were made under licence at
Rüsselsheim. At the beginning of the same month, Osborn and Elis S. “Pete”
Hoglund[102], had been
invited by General Bruno Loerzer, commander of the active air services in the
Wiesbaden area, to attend a dinner at Bad Homburg for all the air force
officers of that district. The last German Ambassador in Washington, Dr.
Heinrich Dieckhoff, had been the principal speaker. After Mooney arrived in
Berlin, he had various business conferences with ranking officials of Opel[103]
over several days. Dieckhoff, according to Osborn and Hoglund, discussed
realistically the definitely sympathetic attitude, which prevailed in the U.S.
towards the U.K. and France, and recognised the strong desire of the American
people to stay out of the war. He insisted that encouragement for the allies
had come from America, largely from official quarters, and without such
encouragement England & France would not have declared war. However, under
all circumstances Germany should avoid antagonising American public opinion.
General Loerzer in his closing remarks at the dinner said it was up to all
officers and men of the Luftwaffe to
conduct themselves in the war so as to avoid any affronts to American public
opinion. Further calls at the U.S. Embassy brought Mooney in contact with
Commander Albert E. Schrader, naval attaché, Commander Piel, naval aeronautics
attaché, Donald Heath, Embassy First Secretary, and Alfred W. Klieforth,
American Consul-General in Cologne. All were most curious about Welles’s coming
concerning which Washington still kept them in the dark about. Nothing of value
to his task came from the visits, though.
Roosevelt’s
own “official” representative, Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles left New
York on 17 February, in a blaze of publicity, and was in Rome on 25 February.
He immediately saw Count Ciâno and then the next day, 26 February, Il Duce, Benito Mussolini.
4.4.
MEETING WITH “von” RIBBENTROP
Mooney
deliberated for some time on how to apply to see Hitler. In the end, he wrote
to the Chancellor on 16 February from his Hotel Adlon, asked Heinrich Richter
to translate it, and then signed the German text. Richter and Wachtler
delivered the letter the evening of 16 February to Geheimrat Hinrichs, Foreign Office liaison officer at the Reichschancellery whom they had been
informed was the proper person to receive such communications for Hitler.
Hinrichs opened the letter, read it and then stated that it would have to be
sent via the Foreign Ministry for comment and approval before it was placed in
front of Hitler. Mooney thought that a more direct approach should be made to
the Foreign Ministry, and telephoned the “Ambassador” Dieckhoff to make a luncheon
appointment for the following day with a view to asking Dieckhoff to use his
connections with Ribbentrop. However, Louis Lochner dropped in to say that he
had just seen Reichs Press Chief Dietrich, who had originally proposed Mooney
being drawn into the peace mission. Dietrich told Lochner that he already knew
about the letter to Hitler, but that the letter would have to pass over
Ribbentrop’s desk before being acted upon, and Dieckhoff would be the best man
to ensure that the letter was dealt with. Wohlthat’s wife telephoned Mooney at
his hotel and asked him to come to lunch on Tuesday 20 February and Mooney
thought that this would be a prime opportunity to acquaint Wohlthat himself
with the nature of the assignment. In the meantime, Mooney kept Alexander Kirk
at the Embassy fully informed about developments.[104]
Dieckhoff
turned up at the Hotel Adlon for lunch on Monday 19 February as agreed, and the
reasons for the trip were discussed. The possibility of seeing Ribbentrop
before Hitler was discussed. Dieckhoff expressed great interest in the
forthcoming Welles visit: the Dr. had asked Lochner as to what the connection
was between the two visits. Lochner had advised that there was in fact no
connection! Dieckhoff stated that Germany no longer had any national interests
which conflicted with those of France and the U.K.: Germany wanted nothing from
France and the U.K. and the only problem remaining, namely the question of the
handing back of the former German colonies, was certainly no basis for a world
war. The next day, 20 February, Mooney and Wohlthat had lunch at the latter’s
house, and asked what Mooney planned to do on this trip [nothing had happened
after his last visit some months previously]. Mooney acquainted him with the
whole picture, and was disappointed that the official routine was to pass the
letter through the Foreign Ministry, based on what Mooney says was a false
impression in Wohlthat’s mind that Ribbentrop had refused to see Mooney in the
previous year. However, Mooney disabused him of this by saying that he had been
prevented by circumstances from accepting the Minister’s invitation to call on
him. Wohlthat asked for permission to tell Göering of the conversation, which
was given, and Mooney promised to keep in touch with Wohlthat. [105]
Immediately
after arrival in Berlin, Mooney worked with his assistant, Bill Wachtler, on
the preparation of a suitable agenda and notes, and these in turn were
discussed with Louis Lochner.[106]
The relevant portion of the text, here, was the Part B, Paragraph 10, where
President Roosevelt’s views on economic freedom encompassed access to raw
materials, lowered barriers to international trade, and the absorption of
unemployed and armament workers in peacetime industries. The President believed
in the concept of the most-favoured nation principle in connection with mutual
trade. The other point of relevance is that if Germany looked forward to a more
orderly political and economic future world, in which the status and advantages
of the white men would not be lower than in the past, Germany could not fail to
recognise the past and potential future contribution of the British Empire to
the maintenance of “white man’s” law and order, prestige, and trading
advantages in a large part of the world for the overall benefit of the white
race. The American view was that the weakening of the British Empire would be
an irreparable loss to the white peoples in all parts of the world. As regards
an aspect that Mooney had touched on before with the Germans: Paragraph 15
stated that public opinion in the U.S. was moving in the direction of
acceptance of the principle of a substantial contribution of surplus
commodities and gold toward the solution of the broad world problem. It was
being increasingly felt that such a contribution would in the long run benefit
the U.S. domestic economy through the liquidation of America’s own surpluses
and through the beneficial influence which release of war materials and gold
into the world economy would have on international trade in general. This is
what Mooney termed “Agreement on a substantial American contribution”.[107]
On
the 21st February, Mooney penned a latter from the Hotel Adlon
addressed to Under-secretary Welles, care of the U.S. Embassy in Rome,
acknowledging that he knew that Welles had arrived in Rome, and offered his
services accordingly.[108]
No acknowledgement of the letter reached Mooney.
Five
days after Mooney’s first contact with Dieckhoff, the acting chief of protocol,
Dr. G.A. von Halem, telephoned Mooney to advise that Ribbentrop would like to
speak with him but he was still ill at home. A few days later, Lochner came to
see tell Mooney that Dieckhoff had visited Ribbentrop at his home, explained
the nature of the trip, and had asked the Minister to endorse the interview
with Hitler. Von Halem advised an appointment had been made with Ribbentrop for
1 p.m. 29 February and that Attaché von Bredow would call for Mooney at his
hotel. [109]
Mooney made an appointment to see Wohlthat in
the morning of 28 February. He advised the Minister that a meeting with Hitler
was no far off and he would like his assistance in making it possible for him
to discuss matters with him, Wohlthat, and Göering as soon as he had seen
Hitler. This he agreed to do. However, Mooney should be advised that Hitler was
particularly sensitive to American press and radio criticism and ridicule, and
so could Mooney please assure the Chancellor that material of this sort was in
fact prepared by irresponsible, non-official people who reflected only their
own personal views. Wohlthat then discussed economic matters and tariffs and
their bearing on broad German policies included in their concept of Lebensraum or “Living space”. The Minister referred to two articles
written by him in economic journals and which he felt reflected the official
viewpoint on these matters. The first might be translated as “International
Regional Markets and the Most-Favoured-Nation Principle”, published December
1938, and the second, “Repercussions of British Economic Warfare”, which had
appeared a few days previously, so therefore February 1940. Mooney was
convinced that with respect to the former paper, Germany still accepted the
“most-favoured-nation” principle as the best basis for international trade, and
that such modifications as were implied in their trade agreements and trade
treaties were regarded as exceptions which should be corrected if and when the
realities of international trade and politics permitted. On 3 June 1935, a new
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights was negotiated between the
U.S. and Germany, but this excluded new trade concessions for the Germans and
the Article VII provisions guaranteeing mutual most-favoured-nation status,
which were contained in the previous Agreement between the two countries. By
1938, 16 countries had entered into reciprocal trade agreements with the U.S.,
and these afforded special tariff concessions that the Germans were not able to
benefit from. With regard to Central Europe, Dr. Wohlthat explained the German
view that the location, size and industrial development of Germany entitled her
to prior economic rights in the Central European area. In this connection, he
mentioned that not only Hungary and Rumania but Bulgaria and Yugoslavia as
well. He stated that Germany does not want political hegemony in any of these
countries, but will not tolerate any outside political interference in them. He
said that Germany regarded Greece and Turkey as Mediterranean states in which
Germany was not concerned. German trade was the largest economic factor in this
area and Germany should be entitled to the opportunity to develop this trade.
He stated further that Germany wag even now subsidising the wheat growers in
these countries by paying them more than
the world price, which practice was directly comparable with similar American
agricultural subsidies. Furthermore, Germany was willing to permit the British
trade to continue in neutral European countries at about its present levels,
which represented about 10% of the foreign trade of this area. In concluding
this portion of the discussion, Dr. Wohlthat felt prepared to state that
Chancellor Hitler would not yield an inch as regards this Mitteleuropa concept. However, “Germany accepted in principle and
without reservation that fact of the British Empire and its political and
economic structure. Germany was ready to guarantee a complete policy of
non-interference in the British Empire and likewise to refrain from any
political activities or propaganda in all of South America”. [110]
Mooney wrote again to Welles on 28 February
and sent a copy of his first letter, and again offered his services. This was
passed in person to Alexander Kirk in the U.S. Embassy in Berlin, and a promise
was given that it would be passed to Welles immediately he arrived in the capital.
However, there was a noticeable change in Kirk’s attitude toward the trip and
towards Mooney’s presence in Berlin. Although Kirk continued to make himself
available to Mooney on his frequent visits, sometimes arranged at short notice,
his spontaneous interest and the evident desire to assist in what he previously
regarded as a commendable effort towards peace had completely disappeared. He
became uncommitted in his attitude, and pleaded ignorance almost until the hour
that Welles arrived, of dates and arrangements of the expected visit: the
impression given was that he was acting on instructions or suggestions that had
caused him to change his attitude.[111]
Ribbentrop
received Mooney at his home on the 29th, and a discussion ensued concerning the
nature of the visit, especially that the President had asked him to travel to
Europe to transmit his views. Ribbentrop regretted the recall of the U.S.
Ambassador Wilson, which left him no alternative but to recall Dieckhoff from
Washington. Mooney was asked if he wanted to see Hitler, to which her replied
that he wanted to deliver the President’s message, and then discuss matters
further with the Minister afterwards. Ribbentrop stated that he would be in
touch again after Welles’s visit. Welles was in fact in Berlin at least the
next day, so the meetings more or less coincided: the two American
representatives were in Berlin at the same time. After the discussion, Mooney went straight to the U.S. Embassy to
acquaint Alexander Kirk.[112]
4.5
MEETING WITH HITLER
Mooney learned through Lochner that the interview
with Hitler had been approved by the Foreign Ministry, and felt as a
consequence that he should take the next step towards a meeting with Göering as
soon as possible.[113]
Under-secretary
of State Sumner Welles finally arrived in Berlin Friday 1 March 1940, and went
almost immediately to see Ribbentrop at the Foreign Ministry as well as
apparently, Staatssekretaer [State
Secretary] Ernst von Weiszäcker[114]
at the Reich Foreign Office, as well as Göering at his home: see below. In the
evening, Louis Lochner advised Mooney that after the meeting Lochner had been
in the Wilhelmstrasse where he had been shown an agenda of the meeting and a
brief summary of the discussions. It was apparent that Ribbentrop had informed
Welles [115]that
economic discussions would be worthless until some political assurances were
forthcoming that the U.K. would no longer strangle German economically. Peace
was out of the question until assurances were given that British political
interference and agitation in Central Europe would cease, and until the control
of strategic points like Gibraltar and the Suez Canal were in some way placed
on a broader base. Ribbentrop also asked Welles for his proposed agenda and the
list of questions he desired to present to Hitler, so that the Chancellor could
be properly prepared for the meeting. Welles gave reporters and press
representatives a hearing at the U.S. Embassy following his subsequent
interview with Hitler, and though he did not reveal anything of importance, the
press despatches reported extremely shrewd and well-informed guesses as to what
had transpired. Although Mooney left cars at the Hotel for both Welles and
Pierrepoint Moffat who accompanied him, he had still not heard from either of
them except a return of cars, and the Embassy did not/would not advise him of a
time and place for the meeting with Welles: repeated telephone calls said that
they were working on the matter and would let him know, but no definite
appointment was forthcoming.[116]
Alexander
Kirk had planned by the afternoon of Saturday 2 March, a large cocktail party
in honour of Welles, to which the entire Embassy and Consular staffs were
invited, as well as American businessmen and newspaper correspondents located
in Berlin. The entire American community was invited, but no Germans were asked
to come, though invitations did extend to Berlin diplomatic representatives of
all South American countries. Up until 4.00 p.m., no word was received from the
Embassy. Lochner arrived at the Hotel Adlon at about 4.00, and expressed
astonishment that Mooney had not received an invitation, and did not intend to
go. Perhaps this was an oversight? Lochner said that Welles was due to leave
the next day, Sunday 3 March, and this would be his only opportunity to even
have a brief word with him and that a trivial oversight should not interfere
with the important matter of advising Welles that certain German views had not
been presented to him by officials that Mooney had interviewed. Lochner and
Mooney drove out to Kirk’s home, and there met Kirk alone in the reception
hall. In the following half-hour, Mooney had a chance encounter with Welles,
and commonplace remarks were exchanged in two minutes only as he had to address
words of greeting to South American diplomat friends in an adjoining salon.
Afterwards, Lochner advised Mooney that several other American correspondents
who had been in Germany a long time and felt that they had understood the
situation had tried to impart some of their knowledge to Welles, but as if by
pre-arrangement, every time that the newspapermen addressed themselves to
Welles, Kirk eagerly brought up someone for an introduction so that no-one
could tell Welles something about conditions as they knew them. [117]
Welles
saw Ribbentrop the morning of 1 March, and then Göering followed by Hitler on
the 2nd and 3rd with minutes being taken by Dr. Paul
Schmidt.[118] He then
saw Göering, Hess and Schacht, and then left for Paris via Switzerland, the
evening of 3 March. Welles also met Dr. Schacht after he had fallen from grace
and after having been summoned by Hitler and told what line to take.[119]Welles
subsequently saw Prime Minister Daladier in Paris, and was still in Paris on 9
March, but then flew to London from Paris arriving at Hendon Aerodrome, ironically
about a half-mile from General Motors Limited’s Hendon Plant, on the 10th,
being met by Ambassador Joseph Kennedy. At one o'clock on March 12 Welles
lunched with Sir John Simon at 11 Downing Street. The other guests were Lord
Hankey, Lord Chatfield, Minister of Co-ordination, Sir Kingsley Wood, Minister
for Air, Sir Andrew Duncan, President of the Board of Trade, Sir Horace Wilson [head of the Civil Service] and Sir Robert Vansittart.
Welles cabled Roosevelt, inter alia,
“Lord Hankey, whom I had known before, told me Mr. Chamberlain had spoken with
him of our talk the preceding evening [Remembrance Day, 11 November]. He said
that I believed I would find I would receive some valuable information when I
saw Mr. Chamberlain again the following day [13 November]. I gathered that Lord
Hankey and Sir Horace Wilson, who joined Lord Hankey and myself after lunch,
were both striving to find some approach to the problem of security and
disarmament which might offer some hope of preventing a protracted war of devastation”.[120]
Welles seems to have also met The King, as well as Foreign Secretary Lord
Halifax, and Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office, Sir Alexander
Cadogan, Sir Robert Vansittart’s successor. Welles must have left 13 March for
Paris again, was then in Rome on 15 and 16 March, and had left for the U.S. by
20 March.[121] The U.S.
Government subsequently formally froze German assets in the U.S. in April 1940:
if they had believed that there was no possibility after all of an economic
route to peace, then the U.S. should take immediate steps to ensure payment of
German debts.
The
meeting between Mooney and Hitler was finally set for Tuesday 4 March. Firstly,
a telephone call was received on Sunday 2 March from Legationsrat [Counsellor of Legation] von Halem of the Foreign
Ministry protocol section, stating that the appointment had been made for 4
March, at an hour to be notified. The next day, Mooney was told that Legationsrat Dr. Hans Strack would visit
him at his hotel to complete the arrangements. Strack arrived with Attaché von
Bredow who had taken Mooney to see Ribbentrop a few days previously. Strack was
in charge for the Foreign Ministry bureau that handled arrangements for
official visits and “distinguished persons”. The meeting, Strack advised, was
at 12.15 the following day after Hitler had seen Sven Hedin, the Swedish
explorer at the Chancellery. Later that day, Wachtler and Mooney made a final
check and review of the prepared notes with Lochner at the latter’s home. On
Tuesday the 4th, Strack and von Bredow arrived at the Hotel Adlon to
escort Mooney to the Chancellery, in a large official car [Mercedes?], and they
were driven to the first corner of Under den Linden where the car turned right
and proceeded along Wilhelmstrasse pas the British Embassy. The Food and
Agriculture Ministry, the former Reich’s President’s Palace, which was by then
Ribbentrop’s official residence, the Foreign Ministry on the right, and the
Justice, Prussian State, and Goebell’s Propaganda Ministries on the left, to the
New Reich’s Chancellery. A guard of honour, which duly presented salute, met
the car. Geheimrat Hinrichs and Staatssekretaer Dr. Brinckman met Mooney
at the lower rung of the outer steps, and at the head of the steps stood Staatsminister Dr. Otto Meissner, head
of that section of the Chancellery which had to do with powers, duties and
prerogatives devolving on Hitler as chief of state, as distinguished from
Chancellor and head of the N.S.D.A.P. Meissner was therefore an official host
during Mooney’s stay in the Chancellery building. Mooney was then met by
Wilhelm Brueckner, Hitler’s personal adjutant, who conducted him to an
ante-room adjoining Hitler’s office. They then had to wait for the interview
with Hedin to finish. The Swede had come on a personal mission from King Gustav
of Sweden, urging Hitler to bring about an early end to the Russian attack on
Finland. Germany did intervene a short time afterwards, and negotiations
between Finland and Russia were soon under way[122].
Hitler shook hands with Mooney, and Dr. Paul Schmidt joined the two as
interpreter, and the only other person in the room was a uniformed bodyguard.
Hitler then referred back to the last conversation that they had had some years
previously, and then indicated his readiness to hear what Mooney had to say.
The President’s remarks offering himself as a “moderator” seemed to intrigue
the Chancellor. Hitler, amongst other points, when discussing the U.K.,
digressed to berate the British Government for its high-hatted attitude towards
Germany. He insisted that Britain and France should come to their senses and
stop talking so loud, i.e. “Who is England to talk to me this way?” Hitler,
Mooney felt, was ready to accept Roosevelt’s services as moderator and his
general attitude was that he had no axe to grind with the U.S. Hitler said that
“Germany regarded it as inadmissible that two countries like Britain and France
should endeavour to rule the whole world by means of their Empires, and to
reserve to their exclusive use the whole of the economic resources of the
world. For Germany’s economic security with respect to the importation of
necessary foodstuffs and raw materials it was imperative that she get out of
the position where Britain by one means or another could take steps every ten
years or so to throttle or impede this flow of essential foodstuffs and
necessary materials and goods”.[123]
The notes on U.S. public opinion that Mooney had written were left with Dr.
Schmidt for later examination by Hitler. However, Mooney felt that he wanted to
talk over these expressions of American public opinion with officials in the
Foreign Ministry and also with Göering and his staff, which Hitler agreed to.
The return journey was a reversal of the inward one, and Mooney was driven back
to his hotel.[124]
Immediately
upon return, Mooney telephoned Ambassador Dieckhoff, and the latter came to the
Hotel Adlon that afternoon [4 March]. Mooney acquainted Dieckhoff of the
meeting in general terms, and read to him the notes dealing with the
President’s point of view, and then the copy of the notes dealing with the U.S.
public opinion. To all of the President’s comments, the Ambassador gave
enthusiastic agreement and approval. Mooney then urged Dieckhoff to discuss the
matter with Ribbentrop so that he [Mooney] could take with him Ribbentrop’s
expressions when Mooney left in the following few days. Mooney also asked for
Dieckhoff to arrange for another short talk with Ribbentrop because he wished
to tell him about the President’s message as he had promised to do after delivering
it to Hitler.[125] Schirer
states that Hans Dieckhoff was “whiling away his time in Berlin” and confirms
that he saw Mooney after his attendance on Hitler, and the former ambassador
immediately reported to the Foreign Office that Mooney was “rather verbose” and
that “I cannot believe that the Mooney initiative has any great importance”.[126]
However,
Schirer writes that Mooney had told Hitler on 4 March “President Roosevelt was
more friendly and sympathetic to Germany than was generally believed in Berlin,
and that the President was prepared to act as moderator in bringing the
belligerents together”, and that Hitler had merely repeated what he had told
Welles two days previously. Further, Hans Thomsen, German Chargé d’Affaires in
Washington sent to Berlin a confidential memorandum prepared for him by “an
unnamed American informant declaring that Mooney was “more or less pro-German”.
The memorandum stated that Mooney had informed Roosevelt on the basis of an
earlier talk with Hitler that the Führer “was desirous of peace and wished to
prevent the bloodshed of a spring campaign”. [127]
In fact, Mooney had not seen Hitler since they last met on 1 May 1934 in
Berlin.[128] Shirer adds that Mooney “was certainly taken in by the Germans”[129],
which is not true: he did in fact know only too well what was happening but he
felt sincere in his aims.
Whilst
Mooney was still having his interview with Hitler, Wachtler called upon Dr.
Wohlthat to inform him that Mooney was having his interview with the
Chancellor, and would thereafter be free to talk with Göering, by then
appointed Reichsmarschall. [Query if
Göering had been appointed Hitler’s successor over the head of Deputy Führer
Rudolph Hess by then?]. Mooney wanted to keep Göering’s office informed as well
as Ribbentrop’s Foreign Ministry, on activities and progress. Mooney called on
Wohlthat personally the day after the meeting with Hitler, namely Wednesday 5
March, and brought him up to date with what had transpired, and asked him to
arrange a meeting with Göering as soon as possible because Mooney was eager to
send word to Roosevelt and hoped to be able to leave for Italy within the
following three or four days. Wohlthat said that he had always felt that among
British statesmen, Sir Horace Wilson[5]
“possessed the most open mind and had the most complete understanding of
Germany’s problems”[130]
Interestingly, Welles met Wilson and Sir Robert in London on his mission. He
said that it was tragic that he and Sir Horace had not been allowed the
opportunity to work out a settlement, because it was certain that between them
they could have reached a mutually satisfactory understanding that would have
made it possible to avoid the war entirely.[131]
Wohlthat also said that regarding the message carried to London in the autumn
of 1939 on behalf of Göering, that the complete plans and circumstances of this
message had been discussed both before and afterwards with Hitler. Hitler and
Göering had apparently felt that Mooney’s errand had been a useful one.
Wohlthat said he had urged Göering against any Polish venture at that time as
it would leave the British with no honourable alternative except for a
declaration of war. Göering had apparently tried to dissuade Hitler, but in
Wohlthat’s opinion Hitler had permitted himself to be guided by his more extreme
advisers. The following day, Wohlthat
informed Mooney that an appointment had been made with Göering at his country
home, Karinhall, 25 miles or so
outside Berlin, for Thursday 7 March at 10.30 a.m. This would require leaving
the Hotel Adlon at 8.30 a.m. for the two-hour drive. Wohlthat was asked to
arrange for him to be the third person at the meeting, in order to translate.
The meeting eventually lasted 1½ hours.[132]
Mooney
arranged with Dr. Strack at the Chancellery for a later meeting with Dr. Schmidt,
in order to give access to the minutes of the meeting that Schmidt had made.
Two days later, on the 6 March, Wachtler and Mooney called on Dr. Schmidt, and
saw the summary statement of what Hitler had said, and which had been approved
by the Chancellor himself. Schmidt verbally translated the statement into
English, so that Mooney and his assistant could write the text down themselves.
Schmidt asked for a copy of the notes dealing with the President’s point of
view so that these could be checked. Mooney subsequently wrote courtesy letters
to Hitler and Ribbentrop, thanking them for their interviews, and giving notice
of Mooney’s departure within a few days. These were then translated into German
by Richter, and delivered shortly afterwards by Wachtler to Geheimrat Hinrichs in the Chancellery.
4.6
MEETING WITH GÖERING
On
7 March, Mooney drove out to Karinhall,
following after Sumner Welles [who was in Paris the same day]. Mooney went over
the Part I of his notes that dealt with Roosevelt’s personal views, and Göering
seemed to be intrigued by the idea of a moderator, as had Hitler. However, the
answer to the President’s offer lay in London, not Berlin: if London agreed,
then the rest would be easy. However, though she could not wait indefinitely,
Germany would refrain temporarily from pushing the war aggressively if assured
that something if assured that something constructive was in the process of
development in England and France. This offer was necessarily limited in time.
Göering seemed greatly concerned about the improvement in German-American
relations, insisted that Germany had done nothing contrary to American
interests, referred to the large numbers of Americans of German descent, but
warned that the cancellation of the arms embargo by the U.S. was in reality a
departure from neutrality [this presumably meant the supplies to the U.K. and
the Dominions]. Göering expressed the belief that if the British were convinced
that Germany was strong enough to fight both Britain and France, they would
both be ready to end the war, and would find Germany equally prepared to do so.
He [Göering] agreed with Hitler’s conviction that the British Empire ought to
continue to exist, but that it must cease meddling in German affairs. Germany
stressed many of the points already made by Hitler, but added that Germany was
fighting for a German sphere of influence in middle Europe which could be
likened to a German Monroe Doctrine. In this sphere of influence, Germany was
ready to extend political, cultural and religious autonomy to all the smaller
states in the German orbit. Göering claimed that the most-favoured-nation
principle was Germany’s basic economic principle in all commercial treaties she
was making, but that necessities of the situation demanded some deviations from
the theoretical principle, just as the Ottawa Agreements constituted certain
deviations from the most-favoured-nation idea. For the countries that fell
within her orbit, the open door would be maintained and the freest possible
trade relations encouraged with the countries of western Europe and the rest of
the world. Göering indicated a strong desire for improved commercial and
economic relations and co-operation between Germany and the U.S.[133]
In his statement of German objectives, the Field
Marshal was very clear. Germany had renounced forever any ambitions upon
Alsace-Lorraine. Germany not only had no desire to impair the integrity of the
British Empire; it believed in her own interest that the British Empire should
be maintained intact
4.7
NIGHT TRAIN TO ITALY
Mooney
and Wachtler agreed that the latter would fly from Rome to Lisbon on Saturday
16 March and deliver the remaining messages to Courtney for transmittal. The Conte di Savoia was sailing on the 16th
for the U.S., and plans were made to place in the Navy pouch a complete set of
Mooney’s five messages to Roosevelt. The rest of the week was spent in careful
drafting of the remaining texts, and the entire set of confirming messages,
together with a covering letter to the President, went into the Navy pouch just
a few minutes before it closed on Friday 15 March prior to its despatch on the
ship at Naples. Mooney states that he did not possess any verbatim copy of the
five cables to Roosevelt: Navy security forbade the carrying of plain English
duplicates of coded material outside the sending offices. Closely paraphrased
copies retaining the exact sense of the original could be taken out under
certain precautions. Mooney thus based his file records on these, though the
text of the original messages appears in Roosevelt’s private safe files in the
FDR papers at Marist University: the benefit of the passage of time has enabled
the texts to be revealed to the public.[138]
Mooney
states that it was “perfectly clear to me that the entirely unofficial status
under which he had been operating had reached the limit of its effectiveness”.
Experiences with the U.S. diplomatic agencies in Berlin and Rome opened his
eyes to the weakness of his position. He believed that the German officials had
not exploited this weakness because of their strong desire to use every
available means for attempting to bring about an end to the war. However,
Mooney could plainly see that his efforts in France and the U.K. would be
nullified unless his position was in some way strengthened markedly. Mooney was
not, however, eager to take on any official status: he was well aware of the
limitations and handicaps involved in an official status, but he needed
something more than Roosevelt’s “innocuous note”. Mooney telephoned Ed Riley by
transatlantic telephone connection and made his feelings known to Riley.
American slang was very helpful he said in exercising caution and judgement in
the conversation. On 13 March, Riley sent a guarded cable indicating that Basil
O’Connor was willing after the five messages had reached Roosevelt to offer
authoritative advice concerning Mooney’s further movements. In order to ensure
that O’Connor had all available facts at his disposal, Mooney decided to send
Wachtler to New York by PanAm Clipper from Lisbon. Wachtler consequently left
Ostia, the seaplane base for Rome, to Lisbon on 16 March 1940, and carried with
him the messages to the President that Admiral Courtney had been instructed to
code and forward to Roosevelt from Lisbon. However, bad weather delayed
Wachtler’s departure from Portugal and later kept him for five days in Horta on
the Azores, so that he did not reach Port Washington on Long Island until the
morning of 27 March. There was no delay though in the radio transmission of the
messages. Riley and Wachtler spent an hour with O’Connor on 29 March, and used
guarded language to acquaint Mooney with the result by transatlantic telephone.
Wachtler stressed [to O’Connor] the fact that for really effective handling of
Mooney’s mission in France and U.K. his [M’s] position had to be made
infinitely stronger with adequate support from the U.S. as well as greatly
improved co-operation from the State Department. O’Connor told Wachtler that he
fully recognised the situation and difficulties inherent therein, but he
considered the State Department’s attitude as being a perfectly natural
reaction under the circumstances, particularly as Mooney was an “outsider”. He
thought it only human for the State Department in the absence of direct
presidential instructions, to be guided by the rules of the game as it was
usually played. O’Connor did state that if Mooney was to carry on with the
program then Roosevelt would certainly know the ways and means by which such
activities could be fortified and implemented. Wachtler and Riley established
from the discussion with O’Connor that the latter had already seen the five
messages to Roosevelt and had read parts of them. Wachtler offered O’Connor the
paraphrased but accurate version of the messages and he eagerly perused them.
O’Connor asked Wachtler numerous queries about conditions in Germany and the
manner in which the messages were prepared and transmitted. He told Riley and
Wachtler that Roosevelt was going to Warm Springs on 31 March and that he would
accompany or join the President there. He implied that Money’s mission would be
brought up for full discussion and advised Riley and Wachtler that they might
expect some definite word about the middle of the following week, namely around
3 April. Wachtler revealed that it was his intention to fly back to Lisbon as
soon as any basis for further activity had been established.[139]
4.8
“WHEN IN ROME”
Whilst staying at the Albergo
Palazzo Ambasciatori Hotel in Rome, Mooney wrote to Louis P. Lochner in Berlin,
and also to William H. “Bill” Harvey Jnr., Personnel Director at General Motors
Overseas Operations, 1775 Broadway, NY.[140] He was trying to arrange for a job for
Lochner’s son who was taking an M.A. in Chicago. Mooney states “…if God gives
us peace, of course almost immediately after his graduation he could join up
with the training class at Opel”. This indicates that Mooney believed that,
before the invasion of Norway at least, it was anticipated that G.M. management
would have/regain control over their Opel subsidiary.
Roosevelt wrote to Mooney on 2 April from the White House, care of
Captain Thomas C. Kincaid, the Naval Attaché in Rome. The letter stated amongst
other things that U.S. public opinion had veered towards a point of view that
whenever peace came it should be a lasting peace, and that some form of
disarmament was of primary importance. Further, U.S. public opinion realised
that the U.K. and France did not seek dismemberment of the Reich but only a
peace that in a thoroughly practical way would make the Reich’s neighbours
secure. This again supported some form of disarmament and with it some
practical efforts to put armament workers into forms of peaceful industry. The
letter reached Mooney in a Navy pouch about 29 April. On the same day as the
President’s letter, O’Connor telephoned Riley to make a luncheon appointment
for the following noon. Riley telephoned Mooney over the transatlantic
telephone of the points of the discussion. The President liked to have Mooney
wait in Rome for a few weeks on the possibility that within that period the
international and domestic situation might have cleared up sufficiently for the
President to decide on the next move, though on the other hand the reasons
which favoured Mooney’s waiting in Rome for further developments were
indefinite in the extreme. Therefore Roosevelt hesitated to suggest an
indefinite wait particularly if there were reasons unconnected with the task
Mooney had undertaken, which favoured his early return. Riley must also have
sent further details of the conversation with O’Connor subsequently: the
difficulty in O’Connor’s and presumably Roosevelt’s opinion was that all of the
principal figures in the European drama were still thirsting for power and were
all a bad lot. It would be fine said O’Connor if Mooney could stay over in
Europe for three or four more weeks: Ambassadors Kennedy and Bullitt had
“already talked themselves out of the picture”. Events might turn out that if
Mooney could stay he might be “the man of the hour”. Against this, Riley argued
that he deemed it extremely desirable that Mooney returned immediately by air
to see Roosevelt himself and ask for advice as to what should be done next. O’Connor
was apparently greatly impressed with Riley’s line of reasoning, and agreed
that no harm could come to the Cause by Mooney’s immediate return. On the
contrary there was much to be gained by Mooney’s coming back and having direct
contact with the President, and then deciding on whether or not to return and
if so in what status. Mooney described Edward Riley as a realist: no matter
what O’Connor might say, Riley felt that the important thing was to get the
President’s own reaction. He therefore told O’Connor that it would be desirable
to check with Roosevelt and pointed out that some of Roosevelt’s decisions and
actions had struck him as somewhat opportunistic and that he did not want to
see Mooney involved in decisions of opportunism or convenience, and that Mooney
was thoroughly devoted to the cause of trying to stop the war. O’Connor agreed
that it would be useful to get Roosevelt’s opinion and promised to telephone
Riley the next day before O’Connor’s departure at 6 p.m. for Chicago where he
had some business matters to attend to. Riley and Wachtler waited until 4 p.m.
and not having heard from O’Connor, tried to reach him. His secretary professed
not to be able to contact him but after being told of his promise to call
Mooney’s representatives, suggested that they try O’Connor’s apartment. Riley
countered with the suggestion that as it was O’Connor who had promised to
telephone, the secretary had better call O’Connor and remind him that Riley
would remain at his office for at least another hour to await O’Connor’s call
[so Riley and Wachtler were presumably in G.M.O.O.’s offices New York City].
There was no return call from O’Connor although Riley remained at his desk
until the time of departure of the train for Chicago. Riley wrote a report that
same day to Mooney expressing his view why O’Connor never telephoned: Riley
believed that O’Connor had purposely refrained from telephoning Roosevelt. This
on the grounds that Roosevelt may have already suggested that it would be
useful for Mooney to wait some weeks so that certain domestic questions could
be first be answered in the U.S. and that Mooney could just as well wait in the
U.S. [as abroad] At the same time, O’Connor may have felt that he could not go
back to reopen the thing again with Roosevelt over the telephone and Riley
though that he refrained from telephoning Riley hoping that Mooney would come
back to the U.S. After this unsatisfactory experience with O’Connor, it was
finally decided that Wachtler would return to Rome by the first available Clipper
flyingboat to bring Mooney a more detailed and first-hand report on the
situation. Wachtler left New York’s La Guardia Airport on 7 April 1940 and
arrived in Rome on 9 April. [141]
After
due consideration, Mooney cabled Riley an American slang message to the effect
that in Mooney’s opinion he [Mooney] should continue in Europe for
approximately three more weeks, contact Nick Vansittart in Rome, Paris or
London, send Wachtler back to New York by ship on 17 April, and remain for one
more week after Wachtler had arrived in the U.S., during which time a final
decision could be made concerning Mooney’s further movements. A few days later,
Riley replied by cable, establishing that O’Connor had not seen Roosevelt
although he had planned to join him on several occasions. However, O’Connor
rang the President in Riley’s presence and had received the suggestion that
Mooney remain in Rome another week and then go back to Germany for a short
visit, after which, barring advice to the contrary, Mooney was to return to the
U.S. Also it would be all right for Mooney to have Nick Vansittart come to
Rome, but Mooney was not to go to London or Paris to see him. Presumably, Riley
had contacted Nick Vansittart by telephone or cable and had received a reply
and due authority. Mooney had already decided that it would be useless and even
prejudicial for him to return to Germany without some word for the German
authorities in exchange for all the information that they had given him. He
also had doubts whether his wholly unofficial status would serve to carry him a
second time as far as had the first. As a consequence, Mooney held to his
decision not to go back into Germany. He did however telephone Riley that
Wachtler would depart for New York on 17 April as suggested, that Mooney would
remain in Rome until about a week after his arrival in the U.S. and that he
hoped the situation would clarify itself meanwhile. Before Wachtler left,
Mooney requested him to call upon O’Connor, Archbishop Spellman, and Secretary
of State Cordell Hull to ascertain their state of mind. Wachtler was asked by
Mooney to be ready to report to him on his contemplated arrival on the S.S. Rex in New York on 9 May.[142]
Whilst
Mooney was in Rome, Cyrus R. Osborn had been requested to work on a detailed
exposé of the position of Adam Opel A.G. which Mooney wanted to transmit to New
York. Osborn arrived with his report on 17 April 1940, and also brought with
him information indicating a notable stiffening in the German attitude: the
battle of Norway had begun and the Germans were by then in a decidedly
“truculent mood”. Osborn had had a long conversation with Dr. Wohlthat, which
he considered so important that Mooney asked Osborn to jot down in the form of
notes that he told Mooney verbally. Basically, Wohlthat was saying that after
the developments in Norway, and he was suggesting that Germany had evidence
that Britain was to invade Norway ten hours after Germany took action, peace
discussions were possible only if the U.K. asked for them and Germany would no
longer make any peace overtures. The results of the fighting in Norway were
tremendously important not only for the outcome of the war but also the
standpoint of military, naval and aviation strategy because it furnished first
conclusive evidence that modern aviation was more than a match for surface
battle craft of all types was.[143]German
aircraft bases could now be located less than ½ as far away as from all the
military objectives in the U.K. than before the Norwegian occupation.[144]
Wohlthat enquired as to what the state of U.S. public opinion was regarding the
German occupation of Denmark and Norway, and also whether the American public
felt that this was justified by the British mining in neutral waters. Osborn
gave his view that the invasion of Norway by the Germans came too soon after
the planting of the mines and that the British mine-laying had been practically
erased from the American public consciousness by the magnitude of the invasions
by the Germans. Osborn further mentioned that the American public recognised that
the Allies had not laid any mines around Denmark and therefore this
justification which was advanced by the Germans with respect to the Norwegian
invasion, did not apply to Denmark. Wohlthat commented that the Danish
occupation was made “in full agreement with the Danes”! [145]
Wohlthat summarised the situation by saying that it was not considered likely
in Germany that America’s position regarding the World War would crystallise
during an election year. He then asked whether Mooney expected to return to Germany
but expressed no interest in any other moves that Mooney might or might not be
contemplating. Osborn drew the general conclusion from the interview with
Wohlthat that the German leaders felt that the Norwegian campaign had given
them a very decided advantage which could and must be capitalised in bringing
the war to a satisfactory conclusion before the next winter. This became
increasingly important in view of the unsatisfactory material situation,
particularly with regard to non-ferrous metals, oils, etc. This was reinforced
by Wohlthat’s remarks about the U.S. election year, representing “a period of
grace” for German activities.[146]
Osborn must have taken the train back to Munich and then Wiesbaden although General Motors World June 1940 stated
that Osborn, “the General Manager of Adam Opel A.G.” expected to catch the S.S. Manhattan in Genoa, Italy in June
and so must have left Germany for Italy by rail or car through Switzerland, and ultimately arrived in New York.
What
Wohlthat never revealed to Mooney was that he had been actively involved in a
plot to finance and install the Norwegian traitor, Quisling, in place of the
legitimate government and so enable the Germans to invade the country. Quisling
was to be paid £10,000 per month for three months from 15 March 1940, and that
currency had to come from resources gained through trade. Perhaps, although
there is nothing at all to prove this, from the sale of Opels in the U.K.
amongst other sources ?[147]
4.9
SAILED FOR NEW YORK
Wachtler
departed for New York, and then on 29 April Mooney received a cable from Riley
stating that O’Connor had no exceptional word that warranted Mooney’s changing
plans, and advised sailing on the Rex
on 1 May, and Wachtler and Riley concurred. At about the same time, Captain Kincaid
brought Mooney the President’s letter of 2 April. Mooney though that the
quickest way to reply would be for him to write to Roosevelt upon arrival in
New York. Mooney did indeed leave on the S.S.
Rex on 1 May 1940, with the feeling that something constructive had been
accomplished and the door was still partly open for an energetic move towards
peace. The ship had just cleared Gibraltar when Mooney received a cablegram
from Frank Lynch, “at this time my assistant in New York”, informing Mooney
that his Alma Mater, the Case School of Applied Science, had invited him to
speak at the 55th alumni reunion banquet at the University Club in
Cleveland on 1 June. Mooney though that this would provide an ideal opportunity
to “send up a trial balloon in the form of a speech urging a negotiated peace”.
He therefore spent the rest of the voyage working on the address and had it
types in preliminary form immediately after his arrival. He also drafted a
response to Roosevelt. Mooney arrived in New York on 9 May, and then wrote to
the President the next day. Shortly after his return, Mooney had an opportunity
to show the draft of his address to O’Connor, because he was anxious for the
latter’s opinion. O’Connor read the speech and thought it a very god speech.
Further that it was entirely in good taste. “War or Peace in America” was
delivered in Cleveland, Ohio on 1 June. A fairly extensive network had been
provided, and Mooney had several letters of agreement, and some of disagreement
from people who had heard it. Amongst other comments, he said “I propose to you
that we consider the possibility of using America’s enormous economic and
potential military strength to compel a discussion of peace”.[148]
On
6 June 1940, Mooney received a letter from Wesley Stout, editor of the Saturday Evening Post, in which he
expressed interest in the address of the 1st. He asked whether
Mooney would contribute an article along the same lines to his weekly magazine.
The speech was slightly amplified in certain portions, though reference to a negotiated
peace for France was removed as France had capitulated by the time for
publication. O’Connor was sent a draft of the article, which he expressed as
“quite captured” with it, and asked for two additional copies, one being sent
to the President by airmail and the other to Secretary of Commerce Harry L.
Hopkins. When Mooney arrived back home
at Oyster Bay, Long Island, NY, on Friday 28 June 1940, Mooney found a telegram
from General Watson asking Mooney to come to Washington to see Roosevelt on the
following Tuesday 2 July[149].
Mooney was naturally pleased, he said, to receive this further evidence of the
President’s interest and for the opportunity to pass on some of the information
gleaned in Europe that was not mentioned in the five telegrams. [150]
4.9
THE FIRST NEW APPOINTMENT
Events
in Mooney’s G.M. career made a dramatic change, though, from 18 June 1940.
Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., Chairman of the Corporation announced that Roosevelt had
appointed William S. Knudsen, President of the Corporation, as head of
Industrial Production on the Advisory Commission of the Council of National
Defense early in June. Knudsen asked for and received leave of absence from
G.M. to take up the appointment. Charles E. Wilson who was formerly Executive
Vice-president was appointed Acting President. Sloan stated that the production
of highly technical equipment which would naturally be involved in such a
program, would require in many cases a considerable background of engineering
for the development of new machinery, and the modification of existing
machinery for its adaptation to military purposes. James D. Mooney was
therefore relieved of his responsibilities in connection with G.M.O.O., and
transferred to Detroit as Executive Assistant to Acting President Wilson.
Mooney then became responsible specifically for all negotiations involving
Corporation sales of materials for defence purposes, including general
supervision over such production and engineering liaison as may be essential
between the purchaser and Corporation in such developments as may involve new
design or changes in existing design. Mooney thus played his part in better
co-ordination and more effective administration of the Corporation’s part in
the National Defense Program. Graeme K. Howard, Vice-president assumed Mooney’s
responsibilities in charge of G.M.O.O. Howard announced in turn the appointment
of Edward C. Riley as Acting Manager of Overseas Operations. Riley then
announced that W.K. Norton, Distribution Manager, had left G.M.O.O. to assume a
new position in connection with the Defense Materials Program. Mooney was to
retain his offices in New York, with his then staff, and was to open additional
offices in Detroit where a large part of his activities would be centred.
Norton was to be headquartered in Washington, and W.B. “Bill” Wachtler, who
also left G.M.O.O. and was headquartered in New York, were to be closely
associated with Mooney.[151]
Mooney
is alleged to have reported to the newly-appointed head of the Special
Operations Executive. in New York, Sir William Stephenson, that at a meeting at
the Waldorf Astoria in N.Y.C. on 26 June 1940, the German intelligence agent
and “trade official”, Dr. Gerhard Alois Westrick, had discussed the inevitable
defeat of Britain within three months with various U.S. executives representing
business interests in Germany and France. Mooney is claimed to have represented
General Motors and Edsel Ford, the Ford Motor Company. Mooney was expected to
pressure Roosevelt into suspending help for Britain so that the Germans would
allow G.M. to continue business in Europe. Mooney supposedly reported to
Stephenson that U.S. corporations were being offered trade monopolies inside
the new Nazi empire, and in return American industrialists were asked to refuse
to join any rearmament programme.[152]
If there is any truth in this allegation, then it is interesting to note here
that Dr. Hugh Dalton was Minister of Economic Warfare still as at the date of
the “meeting”. Sir Robert Vansittart had just been appointed to head the
Foreign (Overseas) Resistance Committee. Dalton was appointed on 16 July to
head the S.O.E., and Sir Robert was asked to offer political advice to the new
organisation. The two men had had a long association, and for a few months in
theory they worked together. Given the connections between Mooney and the
brothers Vansittart, and the latter’s proven intelligence associations, it is
possible that if the meeting did take place then Mooney would have reported to
Stephenson.
4.10 PEACE MISSIONS
ABANDONED?
On
Sunday 30 June 1940, Riley called Mooney to advise that he had just learned
from O’Connor that the appointment with the President on Tuesday the 2nd
July, to which Mooney had been looking forward, had been cancelled: it seems
that General Watson had sent a telegram cancelling the appointment. Mooney
later found out that Roosevelt had called off the meeting at the instigation of
Secretary for Commerce Harry Hopkins. Hopkins had read Mooney’s article and
thought that its general theme cam close to what he thought would be the
Republican platform on foreign policy. He thus told Roosevelt that in his
opinion it would “politically dangerous” for the President to see Mooney at
that time, just before the Democratic and Republican conventions, or to enter
into any discussions of the thesis presented in the article. Thus, party
politics won, and Mooney’s unofficial mission was “no longer viewed in
Washington in terms of an objective evaluation of what he had accomplished and
might yet accomplish, but solely in terms of narrow, partisan politics”. Mooney
made one more attempt to save the situation by seeing Edward R. Stettinius, who
was the Lend-Lease administrator.[153]
Mooney must have known Stettinius because of the contracts placed by the
British and French governments for G.M. vehicles. Stettinius then telephoned
Secretary of Commerce Hopkins, and tried to argue with him. Hopkins knew
O’Connor and Mooney very well, but Mooney “lost out”: Hopkins had put his thumb
down on the whole business and feared that the administration would be accused
of appeasement.[154]
Mooney
realised that President Roosevelt could not cope with the forces of the State
Department, the “narrow politicians of the Harry Hopkins type”, and
propagandists who labelled every humanitarian attempt to prevent a world holocaust
as “appeasement” in the Munich sense. Mooney therefor decided that he had to
abandon any further activities, and wrote a polite letter to the President on 1
July accordingly.[155]
If
Mooney though that this would be an end to any further discussion, then he was
mistaken. In early August, 1940, PM
Magazine, a then new and rather sensationalist Chicago-based newspaper,
published a number of inflammatory articles about James D. Mooney's alleged
association with the Nazi government and accused him of publishing pro-German
propaganda. The articles centred on Mooney's receipt of the German Order of
Merit of the Eagle in 1938 and the speech delivered by Mooney on 1 June, 1940
later printed in the Saturday Evening
Post, "War or Peace in America?" Included in the Mooney papers at
Georgetown University’s collection are numerous letters between Mooney and
General Motors Corporation executives, including Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., and
between officials at General Motors Corporation and PM Magazine, including Marshall Field, III. [156]
4.11 OR WERE THEY?
This
was still not the end of the story: in September 1941 Mooney was approached by
Sir William Wiseman, Bt., a partner in the firm of Kuhn Loeb & Co., and
during the Great War head of the British Intelligence Service in the U.S.
Wiseman was in New York and apparently “groping about for some means of
initiating an effective peace move”. W.K. Norton, who headed the Washington
Office of the Defense Materials Program, and on Mooney’s staff, “chanced” to
meet Sir William at a friend’s home and remarked that it might interest Sir
William to meet and discuss the matter with a more active peace advocate,
namely Mooney. It was suggested that Wiseman and Mooney lunch together, but
beforehand Norton sent Wiseman a copy of the Saturday Evening Post article. When the two finally met, it was
established that there was harmony in their views, Wiseman emphasised though
that any activities towards peace, in order to be acceptable to the British,
would have to be handled in such a way as not to bear any mark of having
originated in London: first utterance on peace had to come from the Germans. It
seemed to Wiseman that only the Pope could fulfil all the requirements and make
the necessary public utterances to prepare world opinion for a negotiated peace,
but Wiseman lacked a direct approach to the Vatican. Mooney therefore arranged
for the two of them to lunch with Archbishop Spellman on Thursday 5 September
1940. However, nothing tangible came from this meeting as English financier and
American prelate spoke in exceedingly guarded language. When they were alone,
Wiseman consequently emphasised the importance of ascertaining what the German
terms might be at that time and said he thought someone like Mooney should go
to Germany and talk with the leaders there, and try and sound out their ideas
on the subject. Mooney and Wiseman agreed that it would be advisable for Mooney
to go to London first, where he might meet some of the leading men inside and
out of the government to get their general sense of how the matter could be
handled, including their ideas on terms for ending the war. Mooney stressed the
necessity of him going to Germany by way of England, and Wiseman agreed because
he would have been cold-shouldered unless he had some reason for opening discussions
with the German government. Wiseman always emphasised to Mooney, at least, of
his unofficial status, but Mooney’s friends reported to him that Wiseman was
frequently at the British Embassy in Washington as the guest of Lord Lothian.
Some two weeks later, say around 20 September, the two men met again: Wiseman
had definitely made up his mind that Mooney should make the trip to the U.K.
and Germany. He even discussed contacts with his friends in London and insisted
that although there would be no red carpet treatment ass it would only attract
undesirable attention, he would nevertheless be given every facility for moving
quickly and reaching the right people. Again, General Motors business was to be
given as the reason for the journey. Wiseman seemed to speak with authority as
though he had been in close touch with British officials and had been
authorised to make commitments.[157]
It seems that Mooney handed Wiseman a set of terms that he thought the Germans
might find acceptable as the basis for peace discussions, and Wiseman then
communicated the same to London.[158]
According
to an article in The New York Times
on 16 September 1940, James D. Mooney was relieved of his overseas duties to
take up the post of managing the automotive arm of the refugee childrens’
program. With Mooney’s permanent removal, Graeme K. Howard was appointed
substantive President of G.M.O.O. with Riley as Riley was Acting General Manager of General Motors Overseas Operations
until May 1941 and also Vice-President of G.M.O.O. as well.[159]
In late September 1940, Mooney had dinner
with Alfred P. Sloan, Chairman of G.M. Corporation, who agreed to co-operate
when Mooney set down a set of terms he thought that the Germans would find
acceptable because they were based on the proposal he had personally received
from Hitler the previous spring.[160]
Wiseman and Mooney met again on 10 October
1940, and the former indicated that his negotiations in London had met with
opposition and that his friends felt that the time was not propitious for
continuing the plan. With the U.S. elections less than a month away, Wiseman
suggested that they might reconsider the expediency of using the Administration
as an intermediary after all. Not long after the election, Wiseman invited W.K.
Norton and Mooney to lunch: he now took the position that in the light of the
balloting results it seemed advisable to ascertain whether the White House
could be interested in an intervention for peace. Mooney offered for Wiseman to
meet O’Connor who might, in turn, be willing to undertake to sound out
Roosevelt. During the conversation, Wiseman agreed to start work on drawing up
a set of peace terms acceptable to the British, which again confirmed the G.M.
men’s opinion that Wiseman had recently had contacts with London. [161]
Wiseman made contact with Mooney at the Metropolitan
Club [in N.Y.C.?] on 15 November and announced that it was time to revive their
peace efforts. Mooney was led to believe that Wiseman had received approval
from the British Ambassador in Washington, Lord Lothian, which was not the
case. There was discussion as to the possibility of Mooney going to Europe via
London on a mission for G.M. that would provide cover for peace soundings.[162]
Wiseman met with O’Connor on 2 December, though the
meeting never went beyond the “getting-acquainted stage” and no mention was
made of a negotiated peace. Wiseman therefore called on Mooney the next day, 3
December, and it was decided that Wiseman had better call on O’Connor again and
lay before him the question of discussing the subject of peace with Roosevelt.
Wiseman frankly informed Mooney that the U.K.’s best interest at that moment
lay in the direction of peace. British Ambassador Lord Lothian had returned
from London back to Washington ten days previously, so this may or may not have
been significant. Wiseman saw a problem though in how the situation could be
manoeuvred so that a third party, preferably Washington, could step into the
role of peacemaker without letting the world or the Germans know in advance
that the British were willing to entertain peace proposals. The mere
implication that the British had instigated the proposal would be crippling to
British morale and prestige. The ideal situation Wiseman thought was for
Washington and the White House to use the U.S. military and economic power to
insist upon the discussion of peace and then to take such a prominent role that
the Germans would be prevented from using their supremacy in Europe to demand
terms too hard for British acceptance. Wiseman thought Churchill would vigorously
protest against any idea of discussing peace, and yet would be secretly pleased
that he was being compelled to accept it. At the second meeting with O’Connor,
Wiseman broached the ideas of Roosevelt acting towards compelling a stoppage of
the war. O’Connor replied sympathetically but was not committal. O’Connor later
told Mooney that he had seen Roosevelt several times but the President’s
attitude seemed to be hostile to the idea of a negotiated peace and so O’Connor
decided that it was not wise to introduce Wiseman’s suggestions. Wiseman must
have anticipated the unavailability of the President as mediator as when Mooney
visited him before he left for a Christmas vacation in Florida, and told him
that he had been invited to participate in a golf foursome with the Duke of
Windsor, he warned that it would be most inadvisable for him to join the group.
Wiseman suggested that he had potential as a neutral who was detached from the
whole affair, and if he seemed to be too friendly with the British, that usefulness
in discussing matters with Berlin might be destroyed. Mooney was advised to
leave well enough alone and not play. In fact, Mooney did meet the Duke, and
they cruised with Alfred P. Sloan on the latter’s boat off Florida. This
vacation was later misconstrued as confirmation that the “pro-Nazi” Duke was in
league with a vehemently anti-British Irish-American. This was pure rubbish,
but the suggestion in print resulted in Mooney’s son taking issue with the
author about the allegation, especially as his father had died in 1957 and was
therefore unable to disabuse personally.[163]
However,
it did not matter ultimately what Wiseman thought as on 12 December 1940 Lord
Lothian died unexpectedly [to be replaced by Lord Halifax]. Sir William was
informed of Lord Lothian’s death at 4.30 a.m., ten to 15 minutes after the
Ambassador died! Mooney returned from Florida and called on Wiseman on 7
January 1941. Wiseman volunteered that he used to have dinner with Lothian
every week and talk things over, and since Lothian had died Wiseman did not
know what to do. Wiseman revealed that he had had close contact with the
Ambassador and had several meetings. It became clear in the final discussion
that Lothian had been continually a silent partner of Wiseman’s in his discussions
with Mooney. Mooney was also convinced that Lothian had been co-operating with
Wiseman in effectuating the tentative arrangements that had been made for
Mooney’s projected trip to Europe. Wiseman was deprived of his “alter ego” and
Mooney’s involvement with him came to an end. That was also the end of Mooney’s
peace overtures[164]:
Costello claims that Roosevelt had proven hostile to
any peace feeler to Mooney’s “intense frustration” and thus his third attempt
at bringing about peace was doomed.[165]
It is appropriate here to add that pre-war there had been a small but
important group of Americans and a larger group of Britons that believed in
Anglo-American understanding being fundamental to the containment and possible
“liquidation” of bolshevism. The group met monthly at 34 East 62nd
Street, New York City, in an apartment: hence it was called “The Room”. This
was or became essentially a private intelligence service that worked in
collaboration with the British Secret Intelligence Service or S.I.S. headed by
Sir Robert Vansittart until 1937 and thence by Sir Alexander Cadogan, and under
them by “C”, Sir Stewart Menzies. The Room was either superseded by or to have
had contact with the Walrus Club in N.Y.C., a dining club whose members were
Anglophiles. The principal point of contact with the S.I.S. was Sir William
Wiseman who became a member of both The Room and the Walrus Club, as was
[probably in the case of The Room] William “Wild Bill” Donovan a leading Wall
Street lawyer and founder of the O.S.S. in N.Y.C. These institutions had the
closest of links with the [Anglo-American] Ends of the Earth Club and the 1b
Club of which Sir Stewart Menzies and Sir William Wiseman were members as well.
[166]Further,
Sir William Stephenson reputedly had Mooney as a member of the “Baker Street
Irregulars”, the groups of amateur intelligence-gatherers who had adopted the
name of the amateur sleuths that assisted Sherlock Holmes.[167]
Stephenson appealed to J. Edgar Hoover in October 1940 when Wiseman was
threatened by the State Department for expulsion from the U.S. for breaches of
U.S. neutrality when his activities became known. In the end the matter was
sent up to F.D.R. who stopped the expulsion of Wiseman as well as that of
Stephenson.[168] Whether
James D. Mooney was a member of The Room or the Walrus Club, or even knew of
their existence in N.Y.C. is not known and yet there is a degree of
circumstantial evidence concerning the interconnections.
5. “STALLFORTH”
Aware of Menzies’s sensibilities, and his preference
for educated men of good background, good manners, and independent finances,
William J. Donovan, the new head of Office of Co-ordinator of Information[169],
which later became the Office of Strategic Services in 1942, made a first
choice for the chief of C.O.I. London in William Dwight Whitney, was well known
to Menzies. Lately personal assistant to W. Averill Harriman, President
Roosevelt’s special representative in London in 1940-41, Whitney is supposed to
have been the intermediary between James D. Mooney, apparently known to “C” as
Stallforth, one of the men whom Brigaderführer
SS Schellenburg claimed later was a spy for England in 1940.
However, extensive research in several publications
that repeat the same basic allegation, and also of the O.S.S. Archives in the
U.S. have proven that firstly there is not a scrap of evidence to prove that
this was true, and secondly have proven that the suggestions are completely and
utterly bogus. The real “spy” Federico aka Frederic Stallforth, a New York
banker holding dual Mexican/German citizenship was not James David Mooney and
Schellenburg’s statements are wrong on the face of it, unless there was indeed
a relationship between Mooney and the brothers Vansittart that exceeded
Mooney’s admissions in his memoirs. James D. Mooney was not, therefore,
“Stallforth”.
7.
POST-GENERAL
MOTORS
“I
regard British-American collaboration as a cornerstone of peace. The most
fortunate situation that could develop, as I see it, would be for the Americans
and the British to agree on their policies, and for the British to then assume
the responsibility for handling Western Europe through the French and later the
Germans. That would be an effective counterblow to Russian communism in
Europe”.[170]
After Pearl
Harbor, Mooney resigned from General Motors and volunteered for service in the
Production Engineering Section of the Bureau of Aeronautics, eventually joining
the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations. Mooney states that he was involved
in “cloak and dagger work” in the Navy, which seems to fit in with his possible
intelligence activities before the entry of the Unites States into the War.
Mooney seems to have ended his Navy career in the rank of Captain. He then returned to work for G.M.
again in March 1945, and was re-appointed Vice-president of the Corporation, a
member of the Administration Committee and member of the board of directors.[171]
General Motors Corporation announced in
January 1946 that Edward C. Riley had succeeded Mooney as “group executive of General Motors Overseas Operations”
although judging by later positions it should properly be termed Group
Executive of G.M.O.O.[172],
in addition to his position as General Manager. Thus, it seems that Mooney was
given the former title when he rejoined G.M., although Graeme K. Howard his
erstwhile replacement became Vice-president in charge of Europe until he
resigned in 1947 and joined Ford.[173]
After his resignation in January 1946, Mooney was appointed President of
Willys-Overland for three years, resigning in the summer of 1949. Whilst at
Willys-Overland, Mooney was concerned for the wife and family of the former
Opel Attorney, Heinrich Richter, who had been arrested by the Soviets and
imprisoned in Moscow for some years.
After leaving Willys, in Toledo, Ohio, Mooney became
an industrial consultant with an office in New York: J.D. Mooney Associates, 11
West 42nd Street. In 1953 he seems to have still been in touch with
Dr. Helmuth Wohlthat through Louis P. Lochner.
In
February 1954, Mooney was elected president, chief executive officer and a
director of R. Hoe and Co. Inc. Mooney is quoted in the official press release,
with photograph, as assisting the Hoover Commission on Organization of the
Executive Branch of the Government. Mooney was also a member of the Naval Air
Advisory Council, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, and the American
Institute of Mining and Metallurgical Engineers. On 26 February 1954, Lochner
wrote to Mooney, and commented that Wohlthat “wrote me recently that he had a
fine huddle with you. Unfortunately he did not know my New Jersey address [Fair
Haven, NJ], so we didn’t get together here. But then, I saw a good deal of him
in Germany”.
On
4 April 1955, Lochner wrote to Mooney again, and commented that after the war
“the General Motors boys” had violently objected to their names being drawn
into the affair [the peace missions]. Lochner stated that in the discussions
that he had with Wohlthat after the war, Lochner realised that Wohlthat was
“very proud of having been associated with you in apart of the venture".
Mooney replied on 19 April 1955, saying that he was no longer at R. Hoe &
Co., and he was care of the 11 West 42nd Street address. He was
leaving for South America for a few days, and then was due back in New York 1
June. Mooney commented:
“Incidentally, you and I can feel better now, although our views were
extremely unpopular for many years, it is being increasingly recognised that
Hitler could have been bumped off, and bloodthirsty, diabolical, Stalin could
have been checkmated without the world being precipitated into chaos and tens
of millions of people being tossed into slavery, starvation, and gruesome
disease.”
James
David Mooney died at the age of 73 on 21 September 1957, in Tucson, Arizona
where he had retired to shortly before because of health reasons. His second
wife, four sons and two daughters survived him, and members of his family still
own the large mansion at Oyster Bay, Long Island, New York, as well as it is
believed the Tucson property.
James
David “Jim” Mooney had his last entry in General
Motors World, October 1957[174].
The Obituary stated that Mooney had staffed the original G.M. Export Company
with a group of young men who grew up with the business, and under Mooney’s
imaginative leadership, they developed in foreign experience. The General
Motors Overseas Division at that time was under the direction of those men whom
he recruited in the 1920’s. Edward Creaser Riley, whom Mooney had recruited on
1 January 1923 was General Manager of the Overseas Division for 19 years and
retired finally on 1 July 1959. Elis Sterner “Pete” Hoglund, Assistant General
Manager since 1947 and who joined the Export Division in 1927, replaced him.
Hoglund stayed on after the evacuation of personnel from Germany in 1939 and
then 1940, and was the last man apart from an Accountant, to leave Adam Opel
and Germany in February 1941. Edward Zdunek became Managing Director of Opel in
1948, and relinquished active management in March 1961 because of illness and
retired 1 September 1961 after 36 years with G.M. Zdunek replaced Nick Vansittart
at G.M. Continental in Antwerp in 1937. Guy Nicholas Vansittart was
continuously a director of General Motors Limited from 1938 to 1958. Post-war,
he was elected Chairman of the Board of Vauxhall Motors Limited in July 1948,
and then at a meeting of the Board on 22 April 1953, he relinquished his office
in favour of Sir Charles Bartlett. On 23 April 1953, the Board of Directors of
General Motors Limited elected Vansittart Chairman of the Board succeeding the
American, Walter E. Hill.[175]
Hill then resigned and returned to the U.S. in February 1955, and Vansittart
succeeded him. Vansittart finally retired as Director and Chairman of the
Boards of General Motors Limited and Vauxhall Motors Limited 30 September 1958.
Riley, Hoglund, Ed Zdunek, and Wachtler all
complained to Mooney in 1947 that their names were suggested as being included
in Mooney’s book being drafted by Lochner. They stated that General Motors had
nothing to do with the missions, and effectively demanded that they not be
mentioned in the book if it was ever published, and they hoped that it was not!
Lochner wrote his own memoirs in the end, and advised Mooney that he was not
going to refer to any names
However, one name that should have cropped up in any
post-war objection in 1947 was that of Nick Vansittart: if he had any concerns
at his name being mentioned, then he would have made his views clear. The fact
that he did not can perhaps be explained by the relationship between the
gentlemen from 1925 to 1945.
There
have been numerous allegations in publications and elsewhere that James D.
Mooney was “pro-Nazi”, “an anti-British Irish-American”, and a collaborator.
This was not the case: quite the reverse was true, and Mooney, with Sloan,
Howard, Riley and others strove to ensure that military build-up in Germany was
balanced if not exceeded by those countries opposing Nazism. These are some of
the most publicised, and oft-quoted statements:
1.
This is the first allegation:
“Due to their multinational dominance of motor vehicle production, G.M.
and Ford became principle suppliers for the forces of fascism as well as the
forces of democracy. It may, of course, be argued that participating in both
sides of an international conflict, like the common corporate practice of
investing in both political parties before and election, is an appropriate
corporate activity. Had the Nazis won, General Motors and Ford would have
appeared impeccably Nazi; as Hitler lost, these companies were able to
re-emerge impeccably American. In either case, the viability of these
corporations and the interests of their respective stockholders would have been
preserved.
General Motors has owned 100% of Adam Opel A.G. continuously since 1929 [incorrect the balance of shares was
acquired in 1931]. Accordingly, it selected the Board of Directors and
appointed the management, which supervised wartime operations of all Opel
Plants, including the aircraft production facility at Rüsselsheim. Alfred P.
Sloan, Jr.,, Board Chairman of G.M.-U.S.A. and G.M. Vice-Presidents James D.
Mooney, John T. Smith, and Graeme K. Howard served on the G.M.-Opel Board of
Directors throughout the War [This is
incorrect: Mooney had resigned or been removed as a director in the autumn of
1941]. G.M. continued to operate its Opel plants after the U.S. had
formally declared war on Germany [December
11 1941] without any apparent interference by the German government until
November 25 1942. At that time, Professor Dr. Carl Lüer was appointed as an
administrator of the Rüsselsheim warplane plant, as Enemy Property Custodian
[Professor of economics, Dr. Lüer was appointed a director of Adam Opel A.G. in
1935]. The Darmstadt Provincial Court of Appeal stressed in its appointment of
Lüer, however, that “the authority of the Board of Directors shall not be
affected by this administrative decision.
The management during the war remained essentially the same as pre-war,
with the exception of American personnel.
Communication as well as materiel continually flowed between G.M. plants
in Allied countries and G.M. plants in Axis-controlled areas, presumably in
direct violation of trading with the Enemy legislation. The Rüsselsheim Plant
records show that the Plant was dealing with G.M. companies in Axis and Allied
countries all over the world including General Motors China Limited, Shanghai
and Hong Kong, General Motors Uruguaya in Montevideo, G.M. do Brazil, Sâo
Caetano, and General Motors Overseas Corporation in New York: Adam Opel A.G. Jahresbericht Und Bilanz Fur
Das…….Geschaftsjahr 1944.
November 1940 saw the last
Opel cars for the domestic market at least as concentration was made on the
Truck production, and also aircraft production.”[176] This is correct!
2. During the
last quarter of 1939 General Motors converted its 432 acre Rüsselsheim Plant to
warplane production, producing 50% of all requirements of the engines for the
Junkers 88. In February 1940, Junkers aero-engines and cockpits and canopies
for the Ju.88 as well as running gear, frame components, and electrical
harnesses with instrument panels were made under licence. Göering allegedly
arranged this, with parts delivered to Junkers at Dessau. However, allegations
have been made that James D. Mooney oversaw and arranged for the Plant to be
remodelled for Junkers production. This appears to be correct
3. “Mooney
probably thought that the war would be over very quickly, so why should we give
our wonderful company away”: Anita Kugler, Researcher of Nazi records.
4. Mooney told journalist Henry Paynter in the Autumn of 1940 that he
would not return his Medal because such an action might jeopardise G.M.’s $100
million investment in Germany. “Hitler
has all the cards”
5. That an F.B.I. Report into Mooney’s possible security risk quoted him
as saying that he [Mooney] would refuse to take any action that might “make
Hitler mad”; F.B.I. Report July 23 1941
APPENDIX 2
ALFRED PRITCHARD SLOAN, JR. 1875-1966
On October 13, 1916 Durant met a brilliant young
businessman in control of the United Motors Corporation. This was Alfred
Pritchard Sloan Jr., and was so impressed with him that when General Motors
Corporation merged with United Motors December 31, 1918, Durant took Sloan on
as well.
Alfred
Pritchard Sloan, Jr. was born in New Haven, Connecticut, May 23, 1875, the
first of five children of Alfred Pritchard Sloan, Sr., and Katherine Mead
Sloan. His father, a machinist by training, was then a partner in a small
company importing coffee and tea. In 1885 the family moved to Brooklyn, where
it was particularly active in the Methodist Church. (Young Alfred's maternal
grandfather was a Methodist minister.) Alfred, Jr., excelled as a student both
in the public schools and at Brooklyn Polytechnic Institute where he completed
the college-preparatory course. After some delay in being admitted to the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (which considered him too young when he
first applied), he matriculated in 1892 and took a degree in electrical
engineering in three years as the youngest member of his graduating class.
Sloan
began his working career as a draftsman in a small machine shop, the Hyatt
Roller Bearing Company of Newark, New Jersey. At his urging, Hyatt was soon
producing new anti-friction bearings for automobiles. In 1898 he married Irene
Jackson of Roxbury, Massachusetts. The next year, at age 24, he became the
president of Hyatt, where he supervised all aspects of the company's business.
Hyatt bearings became a standard in the automobile industry, and the company
grew rapidly under his leadership. In 1916 the Hyatt Roller Bearing Company,
together with a number of other manufacturers of automobile accessories, merged
with the United Motors Corporation, of which Sloan became President. Two years
later that company became part of the General Motors, and Sloan was named Vice
President in Charge of Accessories and a member of the Executive Committee,
under W.C. Durant.
After Durant left, and Pierre S. DuPont took over as
President in October 1920 in his place, Sloan became Vice-president in charge
of operations. He was also appointed a Director of General Motors Limited 31
August 1921 in replacement of “Durant men”.
Sloan
was elected President of General Motors May 10th, 1923, succeeding
Pierre S. du Pont, who said of him on that occasion: "The greater part of
the successful development of the Corporation's operations and the building of
a strong manufacturing and sales organisation is due to Sloan. His election to
the presidency is a natural and well merited recognition of his untiring and
able efforts and successful achievement."
Pierre Du Pont resigned as President and Chairman of the Executive
Committee of G.M. Corporation, though Du Pont remained as Chairman of the
Board, and also held a corresponding position in E. I. Du PONT de NEMOURS &
CO., largest shareholders in G.M. common shares. Canadian Automotive Trade June 1923 referred. They said that when
at Hyatt Roller Bearing Company, he conceived the idea of bringing together the
larger parts and accessory concerns into a holding company similar to G.M.. He
brought together under the United Motors umbrella: DAYTON ENGINEERING
LABORATORIES COMPANY, Dayton, Ohio; REMY ELECTRIC COMPANY, Andersen, Indiana,
HYATT ROLLER BEARING COMPANY, Newark, NJ, NEW DEPARTURE MANUFACTURING COMPANY,
Bristol, Connecticut, HARRISON RADIATOR COMPANY, Lockport, NY, JAXON STEEL
PRODUCTS COMPANY, Jackson, MI, KLAXON COMPANY, Bloomfield, NJ, and several
others. Sloan was elected President of United Motors. In 1918 U.M. was taken
over by G.M. Corporation headed by W.C. Durant, and Sloan was appointed
Vice-President of G.M. in charge of accessories and parts group. When du Pont
succeeded Durant in December 1920, Sloan was made Vice-President in charge of
operations.
Sloan
had developed by then his system of disciplined, professional management that
provided for decentralised operations with co-ordinated centralised policy
control. Applying it to General Motors, he set the Corporation on its course of
industrial leadership. The next 23 years, with Sloan as Chief Executive
Officer, were years of enormous expansion for the Corporation and of a steady
increase in its share of the automobile market.
In 1937 Sloan was elected Chairman of the Board of
General Motors, and resigned as President, though he continued as Chief
Executive Officer until 1946. Danish-born William S. Knudsen, who had at one
stage worked for Henry Ford, succeeded Sloan as President. Knudsen was granted
leave of absence from G.M. when he was asked by President Roosevelt to become
head of Industrial production on the Advisory Committee of the Council of
National Defense in early June 1940, and was replaced as Acting President by
Charles E. Wilson, formerly Executive Vice-president on 18 June 1940[177].
When Sloan resigned from the chairmanship in 1956, the General Motors Board
said of him: " The Board of Directors has acceded to Sloan's wish to
retire as Chairman. He has served the Corporation long and magnificently. His
analysis and grasp of the problems of corporate management, his great vision
and rare good judgement laid the solid foundation which has made possible the
growth and progress of General Motors over the years." Sloan was then
named Honorary Chairman of the Board, a title he retained until his death on
February 17, 1966.
ENDNOTES:
[1] Had Sir Robert Vansittart been responsible? There is no evidence as to who was.
[2] We know that Mooney did indeed see the President on that day: Marist University, ibid.
[3] Mooney had known the President since at least 1935: Marist University, ibid.
[4] We know that Mooney met the President on this day as well: Marist University, ibid.
[5] Sir Horace John Wilson, GCB, GCMG, CBE, Hon. LLD, was born 23 August 1882. He entered the Civil Service in 1900, was appointed Principal Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Labour, 1919-21; Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Labour, 1921-30; he was then appointed Chief Industrial Adviser to HM Government in 1930, and held the position to 1939. However, he was seconded to the Treasury for service with Baldwin, the Prime Minister, in 1935. He was then appointed Permanent Secretary of HM Treasury and official Head of HM Civil Service, 1939, until 1942. He died 19 May 1972: Who Was Who, 1998.
[1] “Speech for the Car Distributors Section, Motor Traders Association”, 22 October 1935, James D. Mooney Papers, Georgetown University.
[2] Peter Severn Steenstrupp had been Vice-President of General Motors Corporation and General Manager of G.M. Export Company, and Jonathan Amory Haskell President of General Motors Export Company: Steenstrup had been a Director of General Motors (Europe) Limited since January 3 1917, in place of Orville Green Bennett who had resigned from G.M. Export Company in 1916 through ill health. Haskell had joined as Director of General Motors Limited 9 April 1920. Steenstrup and Haskell were replaced by Frederick William Beard at General Motors Limited December 13 1922.
[3] “Address before the Banquet of the S.M.M.T.”, 14 October 1936, Georgetown University, ibid.
[4] Baldwin was Prime Minister in 1923, 1925 to 1929, and then 1935 to 1937.
[5] Hore-Belisha had been Minister of Transport, July 1934-May 1937, and replaced A. Duff-Cooper as Mooney states that Hore-Belisha was “well known to me”: Money’s autobiography, P.8. Hore-Belisha was Secretary of State for War, May 1937 to January 1940: House of Commons Information Office. After Hore-Belisha in the National Government of 1935-40, Oliver Stanley was the Secretary of State for War. Hore-Belisha reconstituted the Army Council in December 1937: Major-General John Standish Surtees Prendergast Vereker, 6th Viscount Gort, was appointed Chief of the Imperial General Staff [later Field Marshall Lord Gort].
[6] Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., “My Years With General Motors”, Doubleday, N.Y., 1963.
[7] HOLDEN, L.T. "A HISTORY OF VAUXHALL MOTORS TO 1950; INDUSTRY, DEVELOPMENT AND LOCAL IMPACT ON THE LUTON ECONOMY", 1983/4. HL-77547, Theses 1983 338.476292 HOL, Open University Thesis.
[8] Holden, ibid.
[9] “Address before the Banquet of the S.M.M.T.”, ibid.
[10] Arthur Pound “The Turning Wheel”, 1934.
[11] Maurice Platt, P.90, “An Addiction to Automobiles”, 1981.
[12] “The future of the motor vehicle in the British Empire”, American Chamber of Commerce in London, 17 November, 1925: Georgetown University, ibid.
[13] General Motors World Number 8 of 1951
[14] James D. Mooney, P.13, “Always the Unexpected”, Unpublished Autobiography, Ed. Louis P. Lochner, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, 1948
[15] Mooney, P.9, ibid.
[16] General Motors World, June 1934, Pp.1-3.
[17] Anita Kugler, P.43, “Working for the Enemy”, Bergahn Books, 2000.
[18] Transcripts are held in the James D. Mooney papers, Georgetown University, Washington D.C.
[19] Mooney, P.13, ibid.
[20] Mooney, P.13, ibid.
[21] Mooney, P.42, ibid
[22] Mooney, P.14, ibid.
[23] Mooney, P.15, ibid.
[24] 18 January 1934:
International Trade
23 January 1934: Paper Money and Gold Prices in International
Trade
23 June 1934: America’s Stake in International Trade
10 August 1934: Paper Money and Gold in International Trade
9 October 1934: Fallacies and Realities in International
Trade
20 December 1934: International Economic Relations
1934: Developing Foreign Trade
10 June 1935: Economic Values of International Trade
18 July 1935: The International Money Situation
17 September 1935: The American Foreign Trade Situation
1935: Foreign Trade and Domestic Markets
24 January 1936: Remarks Before the Foreign Trade Council
7 February 1936: American Neutrality and Trade
16 November 1936: Stabilizing the Exchanges
25 January 1935: The Impending War in Europe- and a Gamble
Toward Halting It
17 April 1937: American Economic Policies for the Impending World War
1 May 1937: What World War Will Mean for Us and What we Can Do About It
18 May 1937: Peace or War: A Trade Policy for America
27 May 1937: German-American Trade A Shadow of Its Former Self
January 1938: Stabilizing The Exchanges
14 January 1938: Some Observations on Economics, Politics
and Government
27 January 1938: European Observations
25 May 1938: Remarks at World Fair Dinner/Foreign Trade Week
16 June 1938: Gold, Paper Money and Commodity Prices
19 January 1939: Paper Money: A National and International
Hazard
4 February 1939: Economic Policies for the Next World War
[25] Mooney, P.13, ibid.
[26] FDR Library, Marist University.
[27] General Motors World, July 1937, P.5. Mooney was in London on 22 October 1935, and he may have visited Berlin as well. His visit to London would have coincided with, and taken in, the 1935 London Motor Show at Olympia.
[28] Mooney, P.17, ibid.
[29] Anita Kugler, P.37, ibid.
[30] Mooney, P.91, ibid.
[31] Mooney, P.11, ibid.
[32] Wheels & Tracks, Pp. 14-15, Number 8, 1984, Bart Vanderveen, Ed.
[33] Ministry of Supply Census, November 1944; registration records held by the writer.
[34] 3 November 1938: Memorandum: R.P. Biddle, S.R. Docks and Marine Manager, Southampton, to Gilbert Szlumper, S.R. General Manager, Southern Railway files.
[35] Maurice Platt: “An Addiction to Automobiles”, P.118.
[36] Harry Hopkins Papers, Marist University, USA.
[37] Mooney, P.21, ibid.
[38] Ten Days That saved The World, John Costello, P. 144, Bantam Press 1991.
[39] Mooney, P.21, ibid.
[40] Mooney papers, ibid.
[41] Dr. H. Schacht had been removed as President of the Reichsbank in January 1939. Wohlthat had spent four years in America as an importer, and had been a resident of Forest Hills, Long Island.: Mooney P.39, ibid.
[42] Mooney, P.22, ibid.
[43] Mooney, P.24, ibid.
[44] Alfred Pritchard Sloan, Junior, Chairman of Board of Directors, General Motors Corporation, Stockholders’ Meeting, April 1939.
[45] Letter to concerned shareholder by Sloan, April 6 1939.
[46] Mooney, Pp.24-25, ibid.
[47] Mooney, Pp.24-26, ibid.
[48] Mooney, Pp.27-28, ibid.
[49] Mooney, Pp.27-28, ibid.
[50] Mooney, P.29, ibid.
[51] Originals in Lochner papers, ibid.
[52] Mooney, Pp.29-30, ibid.
[53] Mooney, P.30, ibid.
[54] Mooney papers, ibid.
[55] See below: Frank Carlos
Lynch was referred to subsequently by Mooney as his “Assistant”.
[56] Mooney, P.33, ibid.
[57]
Letter, 31 August 1939, Biddle to S.R. Solicitor, S.R. files.
[58] Riley joined General Motors Export Company on 1 January 1923, having been invited by James D. Mooney, and they evidently had a close relationship from then on until 1940.
[59] Mooney, P.36, ibid.
[60] Mooney, Appendix 1, Statement by Edward C. Riley.
[61] Kugler, Pp. 39/40, ibid.
[62] Mooney, P.40, ibid.
[63] Mooney, P.5, ibid.
[64] Mooney, P.49, ibid.
[65] Mooney, P.52, ibid.
[66] Mooney, P.54, ibid.
[67] Mooney, P.55, ibid.
[68] Mooney, P.55-56, ibid.
[69] Mooney, P.89, ibid.
[70] Mooney, P.59, ibid.
[71] Mooney, P.59, ibid.
[72] Mooney, Pp. 62-63, ibid.
[73]Costello, P. 60, ibid.
[74] Mooney, P.61, ibid.
[75] Mooney, Pp. 62-63, ibid.
[76] Costello, P.60, ibis.
[77] Mooney, Pp.64-65, ibid.
[78] Costello, P.61, ibid.
[79] The Lease of the Southampton Plant was ready to be signed, and the Privy
Council were shortly to deliberate on the possible leasing of the premises,
ibid.
[80] Mooney, Pp.66-67, ibid.
[81] Mooney, Pp.67-68, ibid.
[82] Mooney, P.70, ibid.
[83] Mooney, P.70, ibid.
[84] Mooney, Pp.72-73, ibid.
[85] Mooney, Pp.73-76, ibid.
[86] This must have been poignant, as Mooney had visited Spain before the war broke out in 1936, ibid. The Republicans had seized the Barcelona Plant but with the war over, the plant was recovered in 1939 by G, ibid.M, ibid. personnel, ibid. It opened briefly but then closed for good, ibid.
[87] Costello, P.61, ibid.
[88] Mooney, Pp.77-78, ibid.
[89] Discussion with Mrs. D. Rylands, Southampton, January 2001.
[90] Mooney, Pp.79-81, ibid.
[91] Mooney, Pp. 82-83, ibid. Copper was essential for wiring and electrical machines, and for alloys use din armaments, ibid.
[92] Kugler, P. 32, ibid.
[93] Mooney, Pp. 84-85, ibid.
[94] Mooney, P.86, ibid.
[95] Mooney, Pp. 87-91, ibid.
[96] Mooney, P.92, ibid.
[97] Mooney, Pp. 92-93, ibid.
[98] Mooney, P.94, ibid.
[99] Costello, Pp. 67-68, ibid.
[100] Mooney, P. 94, ibid.
[101] Costello, Pp.470-472, ibid.
[102] Hoglund was appointed Special Assistant to Osborn in May 1937, and then an executive committee member, 1938. He had previously been Managing Director of G.M. Nørdiska since February 1934. By 1940, he was the second ranking American under Osborn. Hoglund may have also been a director of G.M. Suisse as well.
[103]
Adam Opel A.G. executives,1940
Committee:
Heinrich Wagner, Chairman
Hanns Grewenig, Deputy Chairman
Adam Bangert
Herman Hansen
Dr-Ing Gerd Stieler von Heydekampf
Karl Stief
Deputy Committee members:
Otto Jacob
Dipl-Ing Heinz Nordhoff
Directors:
Chairman: Geheimrat Kommerzienrat
Dr.-Ing. e.h. Wilhelm von Opel
Cyrus R. Osborn, Deputy Chairman
Dr. Franz Belitz
Elis S. Hoglund
Director-General, Graeme K. Howard,
NY
President Professor Dr Karl Lüer
President Alfred P. Sloan [of GMC]
Vice-President President James D.
Mooney [of G.M.O.O.]
David F. Ladin, Copenhagen
Albin D. Madsen, Copenhagen
[104] Mooney, Pp.100-101, ibid.
[105] Mooney, Pp.102-103, ibid.
[106] Mooney, Pp.104-105, ibid.
[107] Mooney, Pp.105-106 and Appendix III, ibid.
[108] Mooney, p.115, ibid.
[109] Mooney, P.111, ibid.
[110] Mooney, Pp.112-113, ibid.
[111] Mooney, Pp.116-117, ibid.
[112] Mooney, P.110, ibid.
[113] Mooney, P.111, ibid.
[114] Mooney refers to Staatssekretaer Dr. Brinckman as having met him: which was correct?
[115] Ribbentrop spoke to Welles in German: he could speak English but this was a trick he had pulled on Mooney as well. and it took a lot of time for translation to be done for Welles to understand what had been said
[116] Mooney, P.118, ibid.
[117] Mooney, Pp.119-120, ibid.
[118] William Shirer, “The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich”, P. 686fn, 1959, 1960.
[119] Shirer, Note 21, P. 1163, ibid.
[120] FDR Safe Files, Cables from Welles to Roosevelt, FDR Library, at Marist University, USA, ibid.
[121] FDR Safe Files, ibid. FDR Library, ibid.
[122] The peace agreement ceded territory to the Soviet Union, but this was short-lived as the Finns joined the Axis when Germany attacked Russia and then attacked the Russians along the new frontier with German backing.
[123] Mooney, Appendix IV, P.22, ibid.
[124] Mooney, Pp.121-130, ibid.
[125] Mooney, P.131, ibid.
[126] Shirer, P.687fn, ibid.
[127] Shirer, P.687fn, ibid.
[128] General Motors World, June 1934, Pp.1-3.
[129] Shirer, P.687fn, ibid.
[130] Sir Horace Wilson made his name at the July-August 1932 Ottawa Imperial Conference on tariffs, etc. at Sir Robert Vansittart’s subsequent cost [when Chief Industrial Adviser to HM Government]. Vansittart said “Wilson had enormous talents, a pure personality, and a sancta simplicitas in foreign affairs. His winning ways captured Stanley Baldwin from me and spellbound Neville Chamberlain, with whom he shared incomprehension of such ugly ideas as mine”. Vansittart states that as time went by, he and Baldwin met less and less amicably, and the longer in office, the less he counted with Baldwin. Further, the Prime Minister never knew enough of tyranny to hate it, whereas Vansittart loathed it with “all of his heart all those who used power cruelly, and found few to share a trait that was un-British”. As Baldwin portrayed himself as a Briton, “ he could not feel comfortable consorting with a passion that he condemned. No wonder in contrast he called Horace Wilson ‘wise, calm and serene’”: Lord Vansittart: “The Mist Procession”, Pp.442-443, Hutchinson & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., London, 1958.
[131] Mooney, P.132, ibid.
[132] Mooney, P.133, ibid.
[133] Mooney, Pp.136-137, ibid.
[134] Mooney, Pp.137-138, ibid.
[135] Mooney states in his letter to Lochner, 20 March 1940, that a day or two after arriving in Rome, he contracted a cold!
[136] Mooney, Pp.139-140, ibid.
[137] Mooney, P.140, ibid.
[138] Mooney, P.141, ibid.
[139] Mooney, Pp.148-150, ibid.
[140] 20 March 1940: Letter: Mooney to William H, ibid. “Bill” Harvey Jnr, ibid. Harvey had been the Export Company’s General Manager in the Twenties, and visited the British, Belgian and Danish plants from March to May 1925, probably at the same time as Mooney was in England.
[141] Mooney, Pp.151-153, ibid.
[142] Mooney, Pp.153-155, ibid.
[143] Interesting point this: the Japanese proved this when they sank the King George V and the Repulse in 1941, and the Royal Navy at Taranto, which the Japanese copied for the attack on Pearl Harbor. However, when the “surface battle craft” took on their own aircraft, this scenario was rectified and the Battle of Midway was the first fought between battle fleets over the horizon from each other, and when neither fleet ever saw each other either. The Germans scrapped their own aircraft carrier in 1940, which was intended to use a variant of the Messerschmidt Bf.109 for seaborne operations.
[144] Attacks could indeed be launched from Stavanger Luftwaffe base, but the distances involved across the North Sea prevented any fighter escort apart from Bf.110 aircraft, if that. It was a long way to northern England and Scotland and a much longer distance back especially when damaged!
[145] One of the reasons for invading Norway was in order to safeguard Swedish iron ore and ball-bearing exports, etc. The “invasion” of Denmark was a very quiet affair…more a walk-in and possession. As a consequence, the Danes were allowed a degree of autonomy and peaceful occupation for some time. The G.M. International Plant in Copenhagen was able to carry on its business for a few years.
[146] Mooney, Pp.155-157, ibid.
[147] Translation of Document 004-PS Copy : “The Political Preparation of the Norway Action”.
The complete report including appendices has been submitted to the Deputy of the Fuehrer by Reichsleiter Rosenberg on 17 June 1940): “The Office of Foreign Relations [Aussenpolitisches Amt] of the National Socialist Party (NSDAP) has had contact with Vidkun Quisling, leader of the Nasjonal Samling in Norway, for years....In January [1940], during a conference between Reichsleiter Rosenberg and Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop it was decided to appropriate to Quisling an initial sum of 200,000 Goldmarks. This money was to be taken to Oslo, in two instalments, by the liaison agent Scheidt where it was to be handed to Quisling. Apart from financial support, which was forthcoming from the Reich in currency, Quisling had also been promised a shipment of material for immediate use in Norway such as coal and sugar. Additional help was promised. The shipments were to be conducted under cover of a new Trade Company to be established in Germany or through especially selected existing firms while Quisling’s deputy Hagelin was to act as consignee in Norway. Hagelin had already conferred with the respective Ministers of the Nygardsvold Government as for instance the Minister of Supply and Commerce [Versorgungs-und Handelsminister] and had been assured permission for the import of coal. At the same time the coal transports were to serve possibly to supply the technical means necessary to launch Quisling's political action in Oslo with German help…..In February, after a conference with General Field Marshal Göering, Reichsleiter Rosenberg informed the Secretary in the Office of the Four Year Plan [Ministerialdirektor im Vierjahresplan] Wohlthat only of the intention to prepare coal shipments to Norway to the named confidant Hagelin. Further details were discussed in a conference between Secretary Wohlthat, Staff Director Schickedanz and Quisling’s deputy, Hagelin. Since Wohlthat received no further instructions from the General Field Marshal, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop-after a consultation with Reichsleiter Rosenberg-consented to expedite these shipments through his office. Based on a report of Reichsleiter Rosenberg to the Führer it was also arranged to pay Quisling ten thousand English pounds per month for three months commencing on the 15th of March to support his work. This money was to be paid through liaison agent Scheidt: Berlin, 15 June 1940: Avalon Project, Yale University.
[148] Mooney, Pp.158-164, ibid.
[149]
The President's Personal File on James D. Mooney (PPF 6448) contains nineteen
pages of correspondence concerning meetings with Franklin Roosevelt and a copy
of Mooney's speech, “War or Peace in America”, before the Case Alumni
Association, June 1, 1940. This file also includes
six cross reference sheets describing related material scattered in files on
Italy, Commerce Department, Navy Department, Basil O'Connor and Walter Reuther
in the President's Secretary's File and Official File: FDR Papers, Marist University, ibid.
[150] Mooney, P.165, ibid.
[151] General Motors World, July 1940, Pp.1 and 2.
[152] William Stevenson, Pp.106-108, “A Man Called Intrepid”, The Lyons Press, NY, 2000. The concern about authenticity is because Stevenson states that Mooney was known to Stephenson by the codename “Stallforth”, which is now proven to be completely bogus: the real Stallforth was one Federico Stallforth, a NYC banker.
[153] However, as the Lend-Lease Act was signed 11 March 1941: the reference must have been to, more correctly, the co-ordinator for “Cash-and-Carry”.
[154] Mooney, P.165, ibid.
[155] Mooney, P.166, ibid.
[156] Mooney Papers, Georgetown University.
[157] Mooney, Pp.171-173, ibid.
[158] Mooney, P.174, ibid.
[159] When Howard left G.M. to join the Army in 1942, Riley was appointed Corporation Vice-president in his placer in May 1942. It is not known yet who filled Mooney’s place immediately, but when Elis S. “Pete” Hoglund arrived back in New York in February/March 1941, Hoglund was appointed to head the Detroit Defense office, returning to G.M.O.O. as Riley’s Executive Assistant in February 1942: General Motors World July/August 1959, Pp.2-3.
[160] Costello, P.399, ibid.
[161] Mooney, Pp.174-175, ibid.
[162] Costello, Pp. 400-401, ibid.
[163] Mooney, Pp.174-175, ibid.
[164] Mooney, Pp.175-176, ibid.
[165] Costello, P. 403, ibid.
[166] Anthony Cave Brown; Pp.127-128, “C: The Secret Life of Sir Stewart Menzies”, Macmillan, 1987.
[167] Stevenson, P. 108, ibid.
[168] Cave Brown, P.206, ibid.
[169] “Will Bill” Donovan was appointed head of the Office of Co-ordinator of Information in June 1941
[170] Mooney, “Economic Aspects of World Rehabilitation”, P.3.
[171] 1946 Press Clippings: Georgetown University, ibid.
[172] Press release, G.M.C., January 1946, per G.M.I., Flint.
[173] New York Times, obituary, 7 December 1962.
[174] General Motors World, October 1957.
[175] General Motors World, May 1953
[176] Bradford C. Snell, Counsel to the Committee on the Judiciary, US Senate, February 26 1974
[177][177][177] General Motors World, July 1940, P.1. General Motors Overseas Operations, New York
APPENDIX 2
EXAMPLES OF SLOAN AND MOONEY
OVERSEAS DIRECTORSHIPS
1.
GENERAL MOTORS IN THE BRITISH ISLES
HYATT LIMITED:
DIRECTORS:
HARRY SKEET
BROOM, DUDLEY LOVELL, ALFRED PRITCHARD SLOAN Junior, American, West End Avenue,
New York City, Vice-President of General Motors Corporation; JAMES DAVID
MOONEY, American, of Van Rensselaer Hotel, New York City, Assistant
Vice-President, General Motors Corporation; EARL ELLSWORTH EBY, American, of
East Orange, New Jersey.
The
initial Registered Office of the Company was at 24 Devonshire Street, London
W.C.1, as at 28 August 1919. By an Agreement dated 2 September 1919, Shares
were allotted as to 20,000 £1 Ordinary Shares in the Company to General Motors
Corporation. As at 25 August 1921, the Directors had changed:
HARRY SKEET BROOM; DUDLEY LOVELL;ALFRED PRITCHARD SLOAN, Jnr., GEORGE
CLARENCE SEERS ; JOHN COATES. The Company was voluntarily wound-up 15 October
1924 and finally wound-up 14 March 1927.
DELCO-REMY
& HYATT LIMITED:
DELCO-REMY
LIMITED changed its name to DELCO-REMY & HYATT LIMITED, in October 1924
when the business of HYATT LIMITED was acquired.
Directors as at 1924/5:
H.S.
BROOM, Chairman; W.O. KENNINGTON. Managing Director; DUDLEY LOVELL; R.M.
EMSLIE; JAMES DAVID MOONEY; JOHN LEE PRATT; Secretary and Registered office:
RICHARD M. EMSLIE, 111 Grosvenor Road, London S.W.1
1938-41:
W.O. KENNINGTON, Chairman; C.J. BARTLETT; G.K.DREW; H.S. BROOM; G.N. VANSITTART
[Regional Director for Northern Europe, based in Antwerp, also Director of G.M.
Continental, Antwerp, and Adam Opel A.G.], C.G. GRIFFIN; N.F. STOCKBRIDGE;
JAMES D. MOONEY; B. RUSHTON; W.F. EDWARDS; W.A. CREWE, MI Mech E Managing
ALFRED PRITCHARD SLOAN, JR. was appointed to the Board of
General Motors Limited on August 31 1921, when Vice-President, General Motors
Corporation.
JAMES DAVID MOONEY was appointed Director July 5
1924, And both continued as Directors until 1934.
JAMES DAVID MOONEY was appointed a Director of the second
General Motors Limited in 1933 and resigned apparently between March and July
1945 according to Headed Notepaper. I now think that he resigned in 1941 in
fact. R.C. Riley as a Director replaced him.
GENERAL
MOTORS (IRELAND) LIMITED:
JAMES DAVID MOONEY was a
Director of General Motors (Ireland) Limited from May 28 1923 to when the
Company was dissolved, September 23, 1929.
2. GENERAL MOTORS IN
GERMANY:
GENERAL MOTORS
G.m.b.H.
General Motors G.m.b.H. was incorporated in 1925.
The history is as follows:
1925, September: General
Motors G.m.b.H., previously sales office, then warehousing operation, opened in
Hamburg.
1926, April: General Motors
G.m.b.H. assembles trucks in Hamburg.
1926, September 6th:
Frigidaire G.m.b.H. incorporated to sell Frigidaire appliances supplied through
General Motors Export Group.
1926, November: General
Motors G.m.b.H. moves to Berlin from Hamburg.
1930,
General Motors G.m.b.H. builds a prototype of the first Overseas bus bodies
designed by the Berlin Body Centre.
1932, General Motors
G.m.b.H. set up as Zone Office of G.M. Continental S.A., Antwerp, and car/truck
assembly finishes in favour of imports through G.M. Continental?
1935, 8 February, 239
Chevrolet cars ordered from G.M. Export Company, NY.
1935, Brandenburg truck
Plant opens.
1937, AC Oil Filter
production starts in Berlin?
1937, First Frigidaire
produced in Berlin by G.M. G.m.b.H.
1937, April, last 12
Chevrolet cars imported.
According to a report in 1943,
the company had a capital of 1 million RM and was owned by General Motors
Corporation in New York. However, control [by 1936?] was in the hands of the
G.M. Export Company, NY, G.M. International and G.M. Continental. By 1939 the
Committee of Control, or Board of Directors included James D. Mooney.
James D. Mooney, also a
director of General Motors Limited, and Adam Opel A.G.
Graeme K. Howard,
Vice-president and general manager of G.M.O.O. until 1940
Cyrus C. Osborn, also a
director of G.M. Continental, and G.M. Suisse?
Elis S. “Pete” Hoglund,
director G.M. Continental?, G.M. Suisse and also director of Adam Opel A.G.
Kaufmann Hermann Hansen,
Wiesbaden
C.R. Osborn fled from Belgium in 1940 back to the
U.S. after the country was invaded. However, Hoglund was in Bienne in
Switzerland [as a Director of G.M. Suisse] when Antwerp was bombed, and it
appears from the Reich Commissar records that Hoglund was granted a general
Power of Attorney over Adam Opel AG in March 1940, and did not leave Germany
until February 1941. He then transferred the P. of A. to Mooney’s/G.M.’s
Attorney in Berlin, Heinrich Richter.
The Company Report says
that the G.M. G.m.b.H. ceased trading in April 1937 but was not liquidated, and
was then resuscitated in the Summer of 1940.
However, it appears in that final year of 1937, 12 Chevrolet cars were
sold. However, it appears that 239 Chevrolet cars were sold, imported from G.M.
Export Company in N.Y.C., delivered in February 1935.
The office address in 1943 was GENERAL MOTORS
G.m.b.H., Berlin W15, though the street address appears to be KURFÜRSTENDAMM
207/8, FERNRUF, BERLIN 91 82 01.
Frigidaire G.m.b.H. was
incorporated under German law on September 6, 1926. In November 1939, Adam Opel
A.G. purchased the entire direct investment of General Motors Corporation in
Frigidaire G.m.b.H., located in Berlin and also in Rüsselsheim. These were
heavily damaged in the War. However, it would seem that Frigidaire appliances
were imported and only manufactured from 1937 onwards, by G.M. G.m.b.H. and
then sold through Frigidaire G.m.b.H. It would seem that the appliances were
manufactured at Rüsselsheim, and traded through the Berlin office.
ADAM OPEL AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT:
Founded 1862, A.G., 3 December 1928, eingetragen 27
December 1928 acquired by General Motors Corporation, March 1929, for 120
million RM
Owned by General Motors Corporation and Opel Family
1934:
Rüsselsheim, and Branches in Aaachen, Düsseldorf,
Bresslau and Magdeburg
Committee:
Dr. R.A. Fleischer
Edwin R. Palmer
Deputy: Adam Bangert
Directors:
Chairman: Geheimrat Kommerz-Raf Dr.-Ing. e.h.
Wilhelm von Opel
Deputy: Director-General Ronald K. Evans
Alfred P. Sloan
Fred Fisher
James D. Mooney
John Thomas Smith
Albert Bradley
Charles Fisher
1935:
Committee:
Dr. R.A. Fleischer
Edwin R. Palmer
Deputy: Adam Bangert
Dipl-Ing. Otto Byckhoff
Otto C. Mueller
Directors:
Chairman: Geheimrat Kommerz-Raf Dr.-Ing. e.h.
Wilhelm von Opel
Deputy: Farbrikant Dr.-Ing. e.h. Fritz Opel
Deputy: Director-General Ronald K. Evans
President Professor Dr. Karl Lüer
Bank Director Franz Belitz
President Alfred P. Sloan [of G.M.C.]
President James D. Mooney [of GMOO]
Vice-President John Thomas Smith [of G.M.C.]
Albert Bradley
Charles Fisher
1936:
Rüsselsheim, Brandenburg/Havel and Branches in
Aaachen, Düsseldorf, Bresslau and Magdeburg
Committee:
Dr. R.A. Fleischer
Edwin R. Palmer
Deputy: Adam Bangert
Dipl-Ing. Otto Byckhoff
Otto C. Mueller
Directors:
Chairman: Geheimrat Kommerz-Raf Dr.-Ing. e.h.
Wilhelm von Opel
Deputy: Farbrikant Dr.-Ing. e.h. Fritz Opel
Deputy: Director-General Ronald K. Evans
President Professor Dr. Karl Lüer
Bank Director Franz Belitz
President Alfred P. Sloan [of G.M.C.]
President James D. Mooney [of GMOO]
Vice-President John Thomas Smith [of G.M.C.]
1937:
Committee:
Dr. R.A. Fleischer
Adam Bangert
C.R. Osborn, General Manager
Deputy: Otto C. Mueller
Karl Stief
Dipl-Ing. Dr. Gerd Stieler von Heydekampf
Directors:
Chairman: Geheimrat Kommerzienrat Dr.-Ing. e.h.
Wilhelm von Opel
Deputy: Farbrikant Dr.-Ing. e.h. Fritz Opel
Graeme K. Howard
President Professor Dr. Karl Lüer
Bank Director Franz Belitz
President Alfred P. Sloan [of G.M.C.]
President James D. Mooney [of GMOO]
Vice-President John Thomas Smith [of G.M.C.]
1938:
Committee:
Cyrus R. Osborn, Chairman
Adam Bangert
William G. Guthrie
Elis S. “Pete” Hoglund
Albert A. Maynard
Karl Stief
Heinrich Wagner
Deputy Committee members:
Dr. Kurt Auerbach
Hanns Grewenig
Herman Hansen
Dr.-Ing Gerd Stieler von Heydekampf
Otto C. Mueller
Carl T. Zaoral
Directors:
Chairman: Geheimrat Kommerzienrat Dr.-Ing. e.h.
Wilhelm von Opel
Deputy Chairman: Farbrikant Dr.-Ing. e.h. Fritz Opel
Director-General and Deputy Chairman, Graeme K.
Howard, NY
President Professor Dr. Karl Lüer
Dr. Franz Belitz
President Alfred P. Sloan [of G.M.C.]
Vice-President President James D. Mooney [of GMOO]
G. Nicholas Vansittart, Antwerp
David F. Ladin, Copenhagen [G.M. International]
1940
Committee:
Heinrich Wagner, Chairman
Hanns Grewenig, Deputy Chairman
Adam Bangert
Herman Hansen
Dr.-Ing Gerd Stieler von Heydekampf
Karl Stief
Deputy Committee members:
Otto Jacob
Dipl-Ing Heinz Nordhoff
Directors:
Chairman: Geheimrat Kommerzienrat Dr.-Ing. e.h.
Wilhelm von Opel
Cyrus R. Osborn, Deputy Chairman
Dr. Franz Belitz
Elis S. Hoglund
Director-General, Graeme K. Howard, NY
President Professor Dr. Karl Lüer
President Alfred P. Sloan [of G.M.C.]
Vice-President President James D. Mooney [of G.M.O.O.]
David “Dave” F. Ladin, Copenhagen [Director, G.M.
International]
Albin D. Madsen, Copenhagen [Ditto]
3. GENERAL
MOTORS-HOLDEN’S PTY. LIMITED, AUSTRALIA
1934-
1935 Board of Directors:
John R. McKenzie,
Finance
Edward W. Holden,
Chairman
Laurence J. Hartnett,
Managing Director
James J. Welker,
Service
James R. Holden, Body
Division
Graeme K. Howard,
Director
Sir Wallace Bruce,
Director
Sir John Butters,
Director
James D. Mooney,
Director
John Storey,
Manufacture
Vernon L Sunners,
Sales
In
1938/9:
L.J. Hartnett,
Managing Director
V. L. Sunners,
Director of Sales
J R McKenzie Director
of Finance
J. Storey, Director of Manufacturing